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
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The Editors
TAX-CUT POLITICS

ONE DOLLAR

AUGUST 28, 1981

**MIDEAST: PREEMPTION &
POLICY • LAW OF THE
SEA AT LOW TIDE •
FRANCE & ITALY: A
SOCIALIST FUTURE?
• TOMATO BOYCOTT •
THIRD WORLD FIS-
SURES • SENTENCING
THE PLOUGHSHARES
8 • FREEING THE FOR-
TUNE 500 • CULTURE,
CLASS, & ETHNICITY •
SUPERMAN MEETS INDIANA
JONES • BARYSHNIKOV •**



**J. BRYAN HEHIR
• TERENCE H. WRONG
• JOHN J. LOGUE • ALAIN
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JOHN C. CORT • STEVE ELLNER • MARY MEEHAN
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WESTERBECK, JR. • DON McDONAGH • ED MARCINIAK •
ROBERT PHILLIPS • ROBERT JACKALL •**



Correspondence

Unspent capital

Boston, Mass.

To the Editors: We are most appreciative of J. Brian Hehir's article "Doctors of the World Unite" [May 8] which analyzes our attempts as physicians to work for prevention of nuclear war. We are working toward the goal described in the title of the article — our second Congress to be held in Cambridge, England in April, 1982 will include physicians from over thirty countries. We hope to meet the challenge articulated by Father Hehir to use medicine's unspent political capital in opposition to the arms race.

We believe, however, that the unspent political capital which the Catholic church could contribute to the cessation of the nuclear arms race exceeds that of the medical profession. During his visit to Hiroshima Pope John Paul II stated: "In the past it was possible to destroy a village, a town, a region, even a country. Now it is the whole planet that has come under threat. This fact should finally compel everyone to face a basic moral consideration: from now on, it is only through conscious choice and a deliberate policy that humanity can survive." This statement by Pope John Paul II against nuclear weapons provides the basis for action by the church on many levels. However, it is not clear that the message of the Holy Father has reached Catholics in their personal contacts with the church. How often are sermons devoted to the need for elimination of nuclear weapons? How many prayers are offered publicly for nuclear disarmament? Are the facts about nuclear weapons taught effectively in Catholic schools?

On the doctrinal level it would be useful for Catholics to know official church position on two important questions:

First, is it wrong for a Catholic to help finance, build, deploy, or fire a nuclear weapon — an instrument of destruction designed to kill millions of innocent people in an instant?

Second, is the church's concept of a "just war" applicable in the nuclear age?

We offer these provocative questions in hopes of aiding the movement within the church to address these issues. There are now over fifty thousand nuclear weapons in the world. The likelihood they will be used is increasing and the fear sustaining the arms race continues to grow. It will require complete commitment by the medical profession, the church and many other influential segments of society to change our course from the disaster toward which we are moving.

JAMES E. MULLER, M.D.

BERNARD LOWN, M.D.

ERIC CHIVIAN, M.D.

Moral challenge

Acton, Mass.

To the Editors: J. Bryan Hehir's challenge to United States physicians to unite and spend our political capital in support of the clinical case against nuclear warfare — we all know — is not at risk of being scooped up in a mad rush toward the barricades [May 8].

For one thing, we are not a community but a collection of communities which have been extraordinarily resistant to unification. Ask officials of the AMA if you doubt this point. Forces that make international communities possible, such as International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, don't carry diverse civil polity groups into union on their coattails. Those guys will just have to line up with other claims for priority status.

On the other hand, the prospective clinical autopsy of a nuclear attack does carry the case against nuclear warfare directly to the doorstep of those who are united in belief and commitment to support moral vision such as is contained in, say, the just war doctrine.

If limited and nuclear are incompatible adjectives, certainly "limited nuclear war" and "non-combatant immunity" or "proportional use of force" are incompatible phrases.

Will the United States Catholic Conference accept the challenge to synthesize traditional moral wisdom with modern destructive capacity and speak to our statesmen on the moral status of limited nuclear war? I would have ap-

preciated hearing more from them about napalm.

JAMES C. LONGCOPE, M.D.

Immensely fair

Minneapolis, Minn.

To the Editors: The reason I subscribed to *Commonweal* was John Garvey. The reason I keep looking forward to *Commonweal* is John Garvey. His latest excellent piece, "Beyond Proof and Disproof" on "The Religions of Pro-Choice and Pro-Life" [June 19], simply cements that relationship even more. Like the magazine as a whole, John Garvey is immensely fair intellectually and emotionally. He knows how to use singular, truly original insights not to tear down positions but to build up new ones.

(REV.) MARK J. HETTEL, C.S.P.

Naïve and uninformative

Montagnola, Switzerland

To the Editors: As one who has sometimes enjoyed and benefited from Jorge Luis Borges's fiction and criticism, I wish to comment on his remarkably naïve and uninformative essay on Walt Whitman [May 22]. First, a crucial factual mistake, which may simply have been a translator's error but is a regrettably important one: Whitman did *not* write in "blank verse," but in "free verse," and there is a world of difference between the two. Blank verse, the measure of Milton's "Paradise Lost," is unrhymed iambic pentameter; free verse has no metrical norm or regularity. (It is,

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
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FREEING THE FORTUNE 500?

WHAT IS ONE to think of the recent Dupont takeover of Conoco? And of the "merger madness" as a whole? Since the start of the year, over \$100 billion in U.S. corporate assets has changed hands. More is coming. In just the past month or so, the giants, mostly oil companies, have drawn lines of credit totalling over \$40 billion. America's declining competitive position in the world market, its obsolescent industrial base, needs rebuilding. Do mergers represent an answer?

It seems doubtful.

On the face of it, as good a deal as such transactions appear to be for stockholders and assorted lawyers and brokers, such investments seem primarily speculative rather than productive. The Reagan tax program unfortunately makes little distinction between the two, and by fudging the difference, in effect it encourages investment in the quick pay-offs of collectables like Conoco rather than in new plants and equipment which take up to five or ten years to get into operation and possibly improve productivity. From the perspective of the problem of declining productivity, merger activity looks like an insubstantial deal for the American public — a mere rearrangement of already existing capital. Will such conglomeration produce new plants, more jobs, more intensive research and development? That's anything but clear.

What is clear is that the Reagan-economic program represents an enormous act of faith in the wisdom of the U.S. corporate establishment, and exposes its leadership to political backlash should the design fail to "raise all boats" on the promised rising tide of wealth. The terrible simplification here seems to be that sheer size of investment will improve productivity. The weakness of this assumption is that there's no direct relationship between the amount of investment and productivity. Indeed, if there were such a direct connection, we would have already seen its consequences — for during the last decade U.S. capital investment has been greater than during any other comparable period since World War II. The fact is that our declining productivity ratios reflect a far more complex nexus of causes — rising oil prices, expanding service sector, low worker and executive morale — than the Reagan simplification takes account of. On the contrary, the "reindustrialization" package — composed of corporate tax relief (the biggest beneficiary, to the tune of \$32 billion, being the oil industry), lowering of top rates of taxation on personal income, export subsidies, the relaxation of regulation, loosening of anti-trust enforcement, and diminished attention to women, the poor, and minorities — leaves all the options in the executive suites of the Fortune 500. Without tax penalties against speculative investment, and with no tax decreases favoring decisions to build new industrial facilities, this is clearly a test for the "economic statesmen" who manage U.S. industry, and whose communal conscience Adolph A. Berle and Gardner Means heralded in their classic 1932 study of corporations.

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What are the odds that U.S. corporate executives will rise to meet this challenge? At their think-tank, the American Enterprise Institute, there's lively talk these days about the "moral vision" and "theology" behind their creation of unprecedented Western wealth. But with government off their backs now, will they defer the fast buck for harder, long-term investments in industrial infrastructure and product quality? They must know, even if Mr. Reagan does not, that their major international competitors like Japan, Sweden, and West Germany have outperformed them — and done so while beset by even worse OPEC strains and burdened with higher corporate taxes, more generous social welfare and job security, at least equal environmental constraints, and by and large more worker and state involvement in managerial decisions. And it may have occurred to them that some of these "burdens" have a direct or indirect bearing on quality products and productivity.

The odds aren't good. It's unlikely the foreign marriage of greater social welfare with profit-delaying productive investment will be much imitated. For without government enforcement to assure a far-sighted corporation that domestic competitors would also assume the cost of social concerns, market pressures rule the game — and meanwhile, there are tax relief windfalls and tempting acquisitions to hand. Already, there are indications the steel industry will use most of its new cash to diversify rather than invest in new steel plants.

One need not resort to the often inflated rhetoric of Latin American critics of multinationals in order to be skeptical of managerial enlightenment. Closer to home, *Corporate Control, Corporate Power*, the Twentieth Century Fund's update of Berle's study of corporate behavior, came out last April (Cambridge University Press, \$18.95, 432 pp.). The author, Edward S. Herman of the Wharton School, disputes the business complaint of over-regulation, at least for big firms, as "greatly exaggerated." Quite the opposite, he finds that Big Business's success in preserving its own autonomy and immobilizing a "weak" government, incapable of addressing major social and economic problems, is remarkable.

More to the point, Herman sadly finds little empirical evidence nowadays for the kind of corporate statesmanship Berle prophesied. Bad news, it would seem, for those profit-deferring long-term investments so important for reindustrialization. Short-term gain, the evidence shows, remains the bottom line and the vehicle to corporate prestige. In fact, today's enormously more sophisticated corporate organization (and, let us add, the harrasing computer print-out of profit performance every executive receives weekly) makes the profit standard "more rigorous" than ever.

Getting a reasonable return on an investment is of course no crime; not even socialists are interested in a losing enterprise. The problem comes with what a "more rigorous" commercial calculus leaves as afterthought — the so-called "externalities" like ecological effects, the social costs of relocations, occupational hazards, job security, and product quality. "Concern about ecology," says Herman. "... or whether catastrophic weapons will be used, or even the preservation of

the local community, are matters which fall outside the planning calculus." The larger the firm, the truer this apparently is. Conglomeration, diversification, multinationality, all enable the giants to move about, take advantage of cheaper labor and superior tax climate, induce government concessions, and abort unionization. Thus far, Herman thinks, neither government nor social pressure has made much of a dent in the power of the largest firms to do pretty much as they like. "In an important sense," he claims, "the success of the larger corporations follows in part from their being *designed* to be less 'responsible' than smaller local enterprises."

We suspect there may be more of a connection between the socially destructive impact of current corporate design and dragging U.S. productivity than usually meets the eyes of corporate leadership. As one executive friend of ours put it, "We're so efficient, we're destroying ourselves."

POLITICS OF TAXES

Was the administration's tax cut victory the sign of a "mandate" from the people? Well, yes, in the sense that the one thing as certain as death and taxes is that most people strongly prefer avoiding both. And yes, in the sense that the president and his allies did a superb job of generating public support and putting pressure on key legislators. But no poll and no set of election returns that we know of indicates a desire on the part of Americans to do what Mr. Reagan claims the tax cuts do: reverse half a century of U.S. history. *Any* administration, we're willing to wager, can rustle up a mandate to cut taxes. The question is, what kind of a tax cut? A close look at the day-to-day politics of taxes shows how much more was operating, on both sides of the congressional aisles, than any "mandates."

Item: Everyone knows about the case of Democratic Congressman John Breaux. Asked if President Reagan had bought his vote in the recent battle over the federal budget, the Louisiana Congressman replied: "No, I was only rented." The rental price: Mr. Reagan promised to drop his opposition to sugar price supports, a key issue in Louisiana and other sugar-producing states. The cost to consumers of Mr. Breaux's support for Mr. Reagan; more than a billion dollars a year in higher prices for sugar and corn sweeteners.

Item: Along the same lines, President Reagan reversed his earlier position and promised to support peanut-price legislation in return for Southern Democratic votes for his tax-cut bill in the House. Mr. Reagan's move clinched at least five votes, four of them from Georgia, the major peanut state. The agreement pledges the White House to work for peanut price support at \$600 a ton, plus an escalator clause for future years, up from the present \$455 a ton. Such higher support prices, of course, will immediately show up in the supermarkets.

Item: For weeks the Democrats in the House worked hard to come up with a more attractive tax package than the Republicans. Unfortunately they were continually being tempted to offer Christmas-tree goodies to this group or that in order to gain support on the floor. The result was a tax bill so riddled

with giveaways that it was only marginally better than the Republican legislation. Typical of the pressures being exerted were efforts by the lobbyists for the independent oil producers, who were asking for exemption from the windfall profits tax on their first thousand barrels of oil a day. The reason the Democrats writing the bill were sorely tempted: of the twenty-nine Democrats who voted with the Republicans on the budget cuts, twenty-three came from the Gulf states where the oil flows. And lest the exemption of one little old thousand barrels of oil a day seem paltry it should be noted that one thousand barrels of oil a day comes to over \$12 million a year. The ultimate result: a bidding war between the Democrats and the Republicans and a bonanza for the oil producers, at a cost of between \$13 and \$16.9 billion over six years.

Item: An administration effort to end an exotic tax break for commodity traders in this year's tax bill lost out after traders conveyed promises of political contributions to Democratic members of the House Ways and Means Committee. The result: a Ways and Means provision that continues an indefensible tax break worth about \$400 million to approximately twenty-five hundred professional commodity traders, or an average of about \$160,000 each.

Item: The Savings and Loan Associations are on the receiving end of much congressional concern this year and are seeking billions of dollars of tax breaks one way or the other. Leading the requests in Congress was a proposal that S & L Associations be allowed to issue tax-free savings certificates, a move that many experts deplore and that would cost the treasury billions in just one year. To add some political muscle to their requests for help, the S & L Associations have their own political action committees. In 1979 and 1980 these PAC's contributed half a million dollars to various members of Congress, with a large part of the funds to members of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee; these two tax-writing groups promptly obliged by approving the move to create the tax-free certificates sought by the S & L Associations.

No one disputes that the S & L Associations are good causes, but the country is full of good causes; the difference is that most good causes cannot afford to pass out half a million dollars in campaign contributions.

Israel & Lebanon

BEGIN & PREEMPTION

THE POLICY BEHIND BOMBING BEIRUT

THERE ARE MANY ways to terrorize a population. Is terrorism a time bomb going off in a crowded Tel Aviv market place—or bombs that fall from the air on an impoverished and overcrowded West Beirut neighborhood? In

both cases, it is women, children, and the elderly, not policymakers or even fighters, who will probably die. "Civilians," they are antiseptically called.

The bloody bombing of Beirut in July was only the most recent and dramatic "preemptive" attack in the present Israeli government's four-year war against the civilian population in Lebanon. As a label put on any Israeli action inside territorial Lebanon, the loosely defined term "preemptive" is meant to justify internationally both the violation of Lebanese sovereignty and the atrocities that are committed there. Officially, Israeli spokesmen emphasize that the attacks are directed only against Palestinian guerrilla bases and that since the P.L.O. is sworn to destroy Israel, all such attacks may be called "preemptive" or even "preventive." This policy counts heavily on a collective Western conscience that was outraged by P.L.O. terrorism aboard El Al airliners, at the Munich Olympics, and in Israeli border settlements during the 1970s and which still regards the P.L.O. as a largely criminal terrorist movement. This sensibility explains to a large extent the reluctance of the Western press to tell the full story in Lebanon and the limited international outcry that Israeli actions in this country have thus far elicited. But for the present, let us concentrate on the fallacies of Israel's "preemptive" policy in Lebanon.

The Beirut bombing was given widespread press coverage for three main reasons:

1. A large number of people were killed or wounded (300 dead, 800 wounded).

2. Densely populated, residential neighborhoods in Beirut, the Lebanese capital, were brutally bombed by Israeli aircraft for the first time since the "sideshow" in Lebanon was escalated four years ago. It was not until Begin's first election victory that Israel began to strike targets in Lebanon on a regular basis as part of a policy of devastation called "preemptive attacks."

3. Perhaps most significantly, Prime Minister Begin officially stated that Israel "will continue to attack terrorist bases and headquarters even if they are purposefully located in the vicinity of or within civilian populations." This remark, like the term "preemptive" itself, is designed to create a number of false conceptions about the nature and intentions of Israeli policy in Lebanon.

First, it implies that a clear distinction can be made between "a terrorist base" and "a civilian population vicinity." While the term "terrorist base" gives the impression of a military compound peopled by fanatic fighters training for suicide missions, in fact, these bases or camps are always sprawling tin and wood shantytowns inhabited by tens of thousands of Palestinian refugee families. There are five hundred thousand Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. In these crowded camps, sons *are* trained as fighters and taught the ideology of the movement, strategy *is* mapped out for the war against Israel, but mostly, there is village life—with women hanging out the wash while old men smoke tobacco in hookas and play dominoes. With no country and no passport, no mobility to seek jobs, no way out of the camps, these families, walled

away in vast ghettos, give their sons to the movement to recover Palestine. Is this an innocent civilian population? If it is not, are Israeli citizens, who are mandatorily conscripted and trained in the use of arms, innocent civilians? Can children and the elderly be guilty or is everybody simply a victim of insane, uncompromising policies implemented by gutless leaders on both sides in the name of heroism and martyrdom?

A number of other serious distortions are fostered by the Israeli Prime Minister's remark that the P.L.O. can no longer "purposefully" hide among civilian populations. This implies that up until now, Israel has resisted bombing areas where Lebanese civilians might be killed as well as Palestinians (leaving aside whether it is tolerable to kill Palestinian civilians in the camps just because they are there).

In fact, since 1978, when an Israeli invasion of south Lebanon created three hundred thousand Lebanese refugees, Israel has carried out a scorched earth policy against the villages in the south, killing thousands of Lebanese Shi'ites in an attempt to isolate the Palestinians from all Lebanese support. During the Lebanese civil war in 1975-76 when leftist forces battled Christian rightist militias, the Shi'ite community (the largest and poorest native minority group) was allied with the Palestinians. Shi'ite-Palestinian relations have been severely strained in recent years as a result of the deprivations and hardships Shi'ites have suffered from Israeli raids. The Israelis would like the Shi'ites to blame the Palestinians, and this tactic has met with increasing success.

David K. Shipler, the *New York Times* Jerusalem correspondent, has written that Begin's attack on Beirut is also an

attempt to pressure the "Lebanese authorities" into curtailing the activities of the P.L.O. in Lebanon, the way Egypt and Jordan did during the 1970s. Mr. Shipler fails to explain that the Lebanese government, as his *Times* colleague John Kifner points out, cannot even "enforce traffic regulations" and has been unable to exert pressure on anybody since the country was ripped apart by a civil war that erupted largely over the Palestinian presence in the country and which continues to this day. Consequently, it is only Lebanese civilians who are being pressured by Israeli attacks—those who cannot afford to leave the country.

Like the Beirut bombing, the recent destruction of eleven bridges in south Lebanon and of the pipeline of the Zahrani oil refinery, which supplies gas and fuel for west Beirut, has not so much damaged the strength of the P.L.O. as it has caused suffering and inconvenience to the Lebanese. Kifner, who is on the spot in Lebanon, emphasizes that because the P.L.O. is not a conventional army relying on fixed supply and communication routes, the Israeli attacks have inflicted "little or no military damage on Palestinian positions." P.L.O. forces quickly constructed makeshift bridges with bulldozers.

By deliberately bombing the Lebanese civilian community, Begin is not pursuing a short-term military strategy to impede the effectiveness of the P.L.O., but a long-term strategy intended to promote hatred between Palestinians and Lebanese, factionalism among Lebanese, and continued civil strife. Since April, the Arab Follow-Up Committee has been struggling to mediate a national reconciliation agreement in Lebanon. Israeli actions have been nicely timed to interrupt the progress of these efforts. A divided Lebanon unable to control the P.L.O. is an excuse for Israel to impose her own solutions. It is a bitter harvest that Begin, who understands full well the web of complex alliances on the Lebanese scene, hopes to reap by attacking the war-weary Lebanese. The objectives are more psychological than military. With nearly two dozen small militias and four standing armies, war in Lebanon has never been conventional.

In Washington and Jerusalem, correspondents blithely echo the empty rhetoric of our state department spokesman, Dean Fischer, who predicts that the nonexistent ceasefire negotiated on July 24 will "evolve into a long-term solution to the problems of the region and to enable the Lebanese government to maintain control over all areas of the country that are in dispute or where violence has flared."

To the Lebanese, who have not slept soundly for six years, these words must sound amazing. They wonder from what disconnected dream world the Americans are speaking. Because of the bombing of Beirut, for a few days, the world suddenly remembers the Lebanese tragedy once again. An eleven-day exchange of rocket fire between the P.L.O. and Israeli forces is declared a "mini-war" although such exchanges have been periodic for more than three years. An undefined ceasefire, which only the U.S. respects, is negotiated by Habib, whom Reagan then hails in a public relations coup reminiscent of the Nixon-Kissinger era. Then Fischer says that the ceasefire will lead to "long-term solu-



tions in the region." Does he mean a solution to the "Syrian missile crisis," the Palestinian question, the Lebanese civil war, or all of the above?

Meanwhile in West Beirut, Lebanese Shi'ite, Kurdish, and Palestinian refugees live together in tightly packed high-rise buildings, sometimes three families to an apartment. How many gunmen lie dead in the rubble of the Beirut bombing, among the bodies of small boys and girls, old men and women? How many future gunmen died in their mothers' stomachs? We don't know. What we do know is what Prime Minister Begin has assured us, that Israel will continue her war against "international terrorism."

TERENCE H. WRONG

(Terence H. Wrong is a teacher and free-lance correspondent who lives in Beirut.)

Tomato pickers

DOWN ON THE FARM

CALL FOR A BOYCOTT

BALDEMAR VELASQUEZ is an impressive man. He came to Boston recently to speak to a meeting of the Labor Guild, the organization that Fathers Mort Gavin and Ed Boyle have kept in a state of health long after most of America had forgotten that the church and labor are supposed to be friends and allies.

Velasquez reminds you of a younger, leaner Cesar Chavez. Like Chavez he grew and ripened in the fields that produce the food America eats. He told us of one moment that was crucial in steeling his own mind and will to lead the tomato-pickers of Ohio in a fight against the agribusinesses that were exploiting his fellow Mexican-Americans.

One day as a boy he watched his father protest when a farmer handed him his pay and the pay was substantially less than the farmer had promised him. The farmer said, "Take it or leave it." His father took it and Baldemar felt deep inside himself the humiliation and bitterness of that unequal contest.

In 1968 he founded the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) to represent the estimated 30,000 workers who annually migrate from Texas and Florida to work tomatoes, cucumbers, apples, and other crops on Midwest farms. The major effort, however, was aimed at the tomato-growers in Ohio, second only in volume to California.

After negotiating some contracts with individual farmers, FLOC concluded that the farmers, too, were victims of the giant corporations. The latter, in effect, dictate the wages and conditions of work when they negotiate their own contracts with the farmers. Since there are two farmers anxious to sign contracts to sell tomatoes to such companies as Campbell's Soup and Libby for every farmer that signs, the corporations can tell the farmer, "Take it or leave it," just as the farmer told

Velasquez's father. And like Velasquez's father, they take it. Of the gross receipts of the industry the farmers receive 9 percent, the farm workers 4 percent, the cannery workers 4 percent and the processors 83 percent.) Campbell's is so powerful that it tells its growers when to plant, when to spray, when to harvest, and in 1979 ordered all of them to mechanize their harvests and eliminate the farm workers.

Faced with the bedrock facts of tomato economics, over two thousand workers had in 1978 walked off Ohio farms contracted to Campbell and Libby. They are still on strike, and they are asking the American public to boycott all Campbell products (including V-8, Pepperidge Farms, Franco-American, and Swanson) and Libby products (including Taster's Choice, Nescafé, Nestea, and Stouffer's Frozen Dinners). The parent company of Libby is Nestlé, and since religious and liberal groups are already promoting a boycott of Nestlé for its hardsell policy of peddling baby formula in Third World countries despite thousands of deaths from bottle-feeding, the plight of Ohio's farm workers is another good reason to observe that boycott.

FLOC is one of the few union organizations that gives you the adversary's side of the story at the same time that it presents its own. One of its leaflets includes the entire text of a letter to Campbell's Soup customers by D.Y. Robinson, director of consumer services. The following are summaries of Robinson's defense for Campbell and Velasquez's rebuttal for FLOC.

Campbell: It would be "improper and presumptuous" and possibly illegal for Campbell to interfere in the bargaining relationship between farmers and their employees.

FLOC: It is not illegal, but very common, for more than two parties to enter into contracts. The propriety is obvious to anyone who examines the bargaining relationship between the farmers and Campbell.

Campbell: The U.S. Labor Department says that in 1978 the average pay for picking Ohio tomatoes was \$4.32 per hour, well above the minimum wage.

FLOC: Ohio farmers do not pay hourly wages, but the piece rates paid averaged out to \$1.96 per hour, according to the only accurate survey made, which was conducted by the American Friends Service Committee. The Labor Department surveys are done at peak season only, excluding the slower beginning and end, and they are based on the farmers' pay records, which don't reflect the number of individuals included on each paycheck. For example, a man's wife and children will often be included on one paycheck. The union is demanding an hourly rate of \$3.50, that is, when piece rates don't add up to that. They are also asking a substantial increase in the piece rate, a guarantee of twenty-eight hours of work for every two weeks, as provided by law in Wisconsin, and some contribution to the expense of retraining farm workers when they are replaced by machines.

Campbell: FLOC has only thirty-five dues-paying members and claims only one thousand out of ten thousand involved in the tomato harvest.

FLOC: We do not claim to represent all ten thousand. Most

of those are employed by farmers contracted to Heinz, Hunt's, and other processors. "Over two thousand workers walked out of the tomato fields contracted to Campbell and Libby in 1978. It was the biggest agricultural walk-out in the history of the Midwest. . . . If Campbell is serious in questioning our credibility with the workers, we offer to have a secret ballot election with simple rules: if we win, Campbell gives us an agreement, and if we lose, we'll go away. . . . FLOC presently has 1243 dues-paying members and over 2200 on authorization cards, most of whom are on strike."

I had a question of my own for Velasquez: why isn't FLOC affiliated with Chavez's Farm Workers and the AFL-CIO? He seemed reluctant to go into that, but it appears that Chavez, who strongly supports the strike and boycott and habitually refers to Velasquez as "our great leader and friend," is not anxious to accept FLOC's affiliation until it has won at least one major contract.

This is a special challenge to the Catholic community because Campbell's Soup has had a successful campaign to persuade Catholic and other schools to have their children collect Campbell labels, for which they give these schools valuable equipment. This, of course, while their farm policy is forcing the farm workers' children to stay in the fields picking tomatoes when they should be in school.

Despite this temptation many Catholic schools have supported the boycott, figuring the educational and moral value for themselves and their children outweighs the value of the equipment. The U.S. Bishops' Campaign for Human Development has given FLOC \$89,000, but this is nothing compared to the resources of Campbell's Soup and Nestlé's. Those who want to help can reach FLOC at 714½ S. St. Clair St., Toledo, OH 43609.

JOHN C. CORT

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Group of 77

THIRD-WORLD FISSURES CAN THE POOR NATIONS CLOSE RANKS?

THE one hundred and twenty-two third-world countries which belong to the "Group of 77" adopted a new approach at their conference at Caraballeda, Venezuela in May, in an attempt to break the impasse in the North-South dialogue. Rather than formulate demands to be made against the North, the South nations devoted themselves exclusively to forms of South-South cooperation in such fields as energy, technology, commerce, and financial aid. This effort was designed to consolidate third-world unity for the purpose of


enhancing the South's bargaining position vis-à-vis the North at the mini-summit at Cancún, Mexico in October, and elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the fissure within the South bloc was much in evidence in the extended discussion over Venezuela's proposal to formalize the structure of the "Group of 77" through creation of a secretariat to facilitate implementation of programs. Brazil and Saudi Arabia, two third-world "giants," along with Argentina opposed the host-country's plan on grounds that it represented a step toward bureaucratization. Indeed this apprehension echoed the famous Brandt commission's report, *North-South: A Program for Survival*, which warned against the "seeming proliferation of international organizations" with their attendant costs due to excesses in "time, staff, and paper."

The objections raised by Argentina, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia, however, were based to a large degree on their own particular concerns. These three nations are especially wary of North-South confrontations (which Venezuela also spurns; see "Rights and Oil: Lowering a Third-World Voice," in *Commonweal*, January 19, 1979) and fear that transforming the "Group of 77" into more than just a periodic forum for South countries may heighten the possibility of such a showdown. Furthermore, the Saudis fully realize that they themselves will be called upon to foot the bill for any massive aid program for the poorest third-world nations.

Venezuela and Algeria champion a Marshall Plan for the third world and have called for a sharp increase in OPEC's International Development Fund which finances agriculture and energy programs. They also adhere to the thesis that OPEC should give priority to third-world countries in oil exports. Recently Venezuela joined Mexico in granting low-interest credits on petroleum purchases to Central American nations, after Costa Rica led an outcry against high oil prices at an international conference in Manila.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has lavished money on other Moslem nations in bilateral programs and along with smaller oil-



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rich Arab states can boast that their foreign aid as a percentage of GNP far outstrips that of the developed nations. However, the Saudis flatly reject the proposal that their surplus petrodollars be channeled into underdeveloped areas through third-world financial institutions rather than via U.S. commercial banks, the World Bank, the IMF and the like. Under such an arrangement the Saudis could be forced into the unenviable role of international collection agents. One African delegate at the Venezuelan conference disparaged the Saudi Arabian position, remarking, "Obviously the Saudis are more keen on getting to sit on the board of Chase Manhattan Bank than on helping out the developing nations."

The so-called Newly Industrializing Countries (NICS) headed by Brazil have expressed serious reservations regarding other third-world financial schemes. One plan would create a fund to stabilize prices of certain raw material and agricultural exports, while another would restructure the international debt of the poorest nations. The refusal of these countries to honor debts could chastise NICS like Brazil which borrow heavily from commercial banks. Fearing a general trend throughout developing areas against repayment of debts, these institutions would be likely to raise their already high interest rates on loans to that part of the world.

Other divisions in the South bloc are not any less pronounced. The bargaining stance of individual countries, for instance, can be characterized as either "incrementalist" or "maximalist." In the former case, the nations withhold their more ambitious proposals from the North in order to reach moderate agreements which can be built upon in future negotiations. On the other hand, most African delegates, as "maximalists," tend to put forward far-reaching demands and embrace a militant rhetoric which is frowned upon by many South colleagues. In another area of differences, several socialist-oriented nations at the Venezuelan conference advocated prearranged increases in South-South trade without considering that such a set-up is incompatible with an unplanned economy.

It may be instructive to compare the fortunes of the South bloc, with its internal diversities, with those of OPEC over a period of time. The oil companies predicted the immediate

COMING: Benjamin Martin looks at democracy's fading chances in Spain; Donald Senior reviews a Jewish response to contemporary Christian doctrines of Christ.

dissolution of OPEC upon its foundation in 1960. Although by mid-decade the companies recognized OPEC's de facto existence, it was only in the following decade that the organization took on a role of critical importance. Likewise the South's call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) received a hostile reception from the United States and other North countries when it was first proposed in the UN in 1974. President Carter initially accepted the NIEO with flowery and idealistic pronouncements, but proved averse to making any important concessions. One delegate at the Venezuelan conference expressed the South's cynical view toward Carter by describing his position as "buying time."

The negative attitude of the Reagan administration toward the NIEO reflects John Foster Dulles's belief that neutralism in all forms is inherently anti-U.S. Reagan has criticized global negotiations for encouraging pie-in-the-sky demands and instead favors bilateral agreements and mini-summits like the one he will attend in Cancún, Mexico, in October. Both moderate and militant South countries reject the bilateral approach which they see as an effort to co-opt some of the NICS and rich Arab states from the South movement. If this is Reagan's strategy, it is certainly feasible enough but it leaves unanswered the question of what policy will be pursued toward the rest of the South. If the OPEC "bomb" of the early 1970s has taught the Western world anything, it is that developing nations with profound differences and internal strains are capable of closing ranks to further their common interests. The lesson of OPEC should not be lost on U.S. policy-makers in spite of the recent tendency to write off "thirdworldism" as a mere fad which has already run its course.

STEVE ELLNER

(Steve Ellner, a previous contributor, teaches in the Department of Economics of the Universidad de Oriente, Venezuela.)

Of several minds: *Abigail McCarthy*

A STAR IS DEAD

CONTENT, COMPLEXITY, CONNECTION

WHETHER WE ARE aware of it or not, each one of us has been dealt a blow by the death of the *Washington Star*—announced by its last owner, Time, Inc., on July 23rd. Washington, like many other cities, will be a

one-newspaper city, but the silencing of dialogue in the nation's capital will have serious consequences for the country.

Admittedly the *Star* was probably unknown to many of those who will be affected by its passing. The *Washington*

Post is, by general agreement, the *Washington* paper. It has been known for a decade at least as one of the world's "great" newspapers, like *Le Monde* of Paris, the *Times* of London, and the *New York Times*, a paper quoted where leaders meet, whose owners and editors rub elbows with the world's decision-makers, and by whose grace and favor politicians, artists, writers, scientists, thinkers, exist or do not exist for their respective constituencies. More than that, since the filming of *All the President's Men*, the *Post* has become fixed in the national popular consciousness as the

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model of what a newspaper is and does and how it works. In the *Star's* final week 618,000 Washingtonians regularly read the *Post* with their morning coffee; only 323,000 were reading the *Star* later in the day.


Why then is the *Star* so widely mourned? And why will its demise make such a difference? One of the obvious answers is that the *Star* was home base to influential columnists of varying views like Mary McGrory, Carl Rowan, and James Kilpatrick. It was the Washington outlet for others like James Reston and William Buckley. That these were read regularly by the nation's policy-makers—or, at the very least, by their aides—meant that they were exposed to a breadth and depth of discussion far richer than if they had only the opinions of the *Post's* Joseph Kraft, Evans and Novak, David Broder, William Raspberry, and George Will to consider in common.

Because of the *Star* politicians and bureaucrats alike were exposed to two editorial points of view. Also of late years the *Star* has provided a lively forum in its "op-ed" pages and Sunday opinion section for occasional contributors whose views would not otherwise reach the nation's leaders. Its book review section under Jonathan Yardley frequently provided a second opinion on books of special import to people in government. Oddly enough, its religious section was more national in its scope and interests than the *Post's* (although the *Post's* Marjorie Hyer is one of the best writers in the field).

"But this need not be disaster," protested a friend of mine. "It could be good if it resulted in a strong single paper with the strengths of both the *Star* and the *Post*." Possibly. The *Post* will certainly pick up some of the *Star's* best people. But monopoly has its built-in difficulties. Ultimately behind every publication there is the single consciousness of the person most responsible for it, and the collective consciousness of the editors and publishers in tune with that consciousness. The inherent limitations of a single and particular vision of life and a particular view of that which is significant and meaningful run through a newspaper and all its departments.

Different ways of working, too, have different end results. By all accounts the basis of motivation at the *Post* is competition; at the *Star*, even through three changes of ownership, the basis has been a family feeling and an *esprit de corps*. (In effort to save the paper *Star* writers went willingly without raises and even accepted the proposal made at one time that they should work five days for four days pay.) No matter who goes from the *Star* to the *Post*, the *Post* can only be the *Post*. That which was the *Star* will be gone.

To non-writers this may seem much ado about little. Aren't we, after all, almost at the end of the newspaper age? Don't most of us get our news from television and radio? But a newspaper is more than news. That is the unacknowledged point in the current discussion. Throughout the history of American cities and towns, the newspapers were more than a source of news. They were the means by which the community knew itself as community. They were a faithful record of the instruments by which people forged community—churches, schools, organizations, social groups, comings and goings. They provided the history of day to day. For one hundred and twenty-eight years the *Star* was that kind of paper for Washington. It was there when Lincoln walked from his boarding house to his own inauguration.



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It was still there when Washington became the capital of the free Western world after World War II. Perhaps from that time on its mirroring of Washington to itself was too partial. "The *Star* didn't follow the people to the suburbs," said one analyst. "If failed to recognize the blackening of Washington, the city," said another. But it would be hard to prove that the new and growing *Post* of the time did a better job of either thing.

The *Star* failed for various reasons: because it was an afternoon paper in a time when afternoon papers are unnecessary and difficult to distribute, because its original and successive owners did not comprehend change, but mostly because it did not attract advertising—or, to put it bluntly, because the businessmen and women did not see fit to give it a share of their advertising and, thus, allow it to earn its way. (History shows that many an early newspaper was supported by businessmen and local organizations intent on building community.) To the end the *Star* remained what a newspaper had once been—a reflection of the world to its community, a reflection of the community to itself. In a time in which most newspapers, trying to be relevant, have changed their erstwhile social sections into sections called "Style" or "Living" and filled them with quasi-case histories and portraits of celebrities and officials in which the subjects are skewered to the page like so many dragonflies and grasshoppers, the *Star* never quite abandoned the older format. It never quite separated the readers into the viewers and the viewed. It kept going, for example, two social columns which kept us abreast—as if by right—of the doings of our well-to-do and prominent neighbors, and a gossip column which was like the amused and absorbed clucking which goes on everywhere about the peccadilloes of the people next door.

Newspapers can integrate or divide. They are a check on each other. They are how we see ourselves. Before they go the way of the railroads perhaps we should give some thought as to whether we want them to go, and what we want of them if they stay. The passing of the *Star* makes it clear that we do not have much time to think.

ABIGAIL MCCARTHY

THE MIDDLE EAST in the summer of 1981 is being shaped by events rather than policies. The policy vacuum is evident in Washington and in the region itself. Secretary Haig's proposal for a "strategic consensus" to counter the Soviets seems distant from the intricate details of the multiple conflicts which compromise the Middle East. The success of Philip Habib as personal envoy of President Reagan is less the product of a coherent Washington policy than a testimony to Habib's extraordinary negotiating skills. At this writing he has defused the Israeli-Syrian confrontation and has shaped a fragile cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) without either party acknowledging the diplomatic existence of its adversary.

It could be argued that, given the distinct but interrelated conflicts presently afoot in the Middle East (Iraq v Iran; Syria v Israel; the PLO v Israel, Lebanon), only ad hoc piecemeal measures are possible. Even if this assertion is valid in the short-term, however, the need for moving away from this crisis-ridden pattern is clear. Three distinct reasons demand a more comprehensive policy on the part of the United States. First, there is the persistent danger of the Middle East becoming the catalyst for large-scale international conflict. Only a few regional confrontations carry this kind of potential. In the Middle East the possibilities for wider conflict are multiple: a regional actor threatened with defeat could "go nuclear"; an Arab-Israeli engagement could draw in the superpowers; or a sudden halt in the oil supply could be used by outside powers as a *casus belli*. Second, even if the local conflict could be insulated, the cycle of violence for the inhabitants of the region is straining the psychological and political limits of human endurance. Both of these arguments, the geopolitical and the political, however, are less immediate than the daily human costs of the conflict, the death toll which escalates each month.

Church/worldwatch

In the Mideast, not action but reaction

J. Bryan Hehir

The need for a policy can be understood in two ways. Positively, there is the need for a vision which relates the several elements of the Middle East problem, and proposes a coherent approach to the principal issues. Both the Camp David formula and UN Resolution 242, in spite of the limitations each contained, provided a framework for negotiation rather than an ad hoc approach to the several crises in the Middle East. Negatively, the need for a policy vision can be seen in the consequence of not possessing a policy; this allows individual actors to shape events unilaterally.

It is this latter point which has particular relevance for U.S.-Israeli relations. In a world of sovereign states, where the right of self-defense is acknowledged (even within the principles of the UN Charter) Israel will certainly maintain an irreducible margin of freedom of action to assure its sovereignty and independence. The way this freedom is exercised directly touches the United States; a special relationship carries special responsibilities. The U.S.-Israeli relationship is under scrutiny this summer because of Israel's preemptive strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and its retaliatory strike on the P.L.O. headquarters in Beirut.

These two decisions sparked controversy for both procedural and substantive reasons. In both cases the key procedural issue was whether the United States (whose aircraft were used in the raid on Iraq) was consulted. The Israeli response has been that both ac-


tions were directly related to Israel's vital interests (hence within its sovereign prerogatives), and that U.S. interests were taken into account by the government of Israel before the raids were made.

This procedural response is inadequate on two counts. First, it fails to acknowledge the direct and immediate link between the United States and Israel's foreign policy. The amount of U.S. military assistance annually provided to Israel creates not simply an "interest" for the United States in Israel, it identifies it with any major military move of Israel in the Middle East. Neither the Arab states nor U.S. allies in Europe think of the United States as an interested but disengaged supporter of Israel. Even though Israel has demonstrated many times its ability to defend its interests, the assumption in the diplomatic world, in the media and in the mind of ordinary observers is that Israel's strength is a mix of its native capabilities and virtually unlimited U.S. political and military support. In this kind of relationship to hear that one's interests have been considered, but to know one's views were not solicited is not sufficient.

Second, the procedural response is inadequate because of the substantive nature of the attacks on Iraq and Beirut. From Israel's perspective both actions were taken in response to provocation. Even if one accepts Israel's definition of the threat posed in each case, the raids are open to criticism. The attack on the P.L.O. headquarters in a civilian sector of Beirut was undertaken after Palestinian shelling of Israeli villages. The P.L.O. attack on civilians is indefensible. The Israeli reprisal is equally indefensible and overwhelmingly disproportionate. Prime Minister Begin's comment, that he would disregard American criticism of civilian deaths because he remembers well U.S. policy in Vietnam, misses the point that it was precisely this issue that galvanized opposition to the war in the United States.

The attack on the Iraqi reactor raises

(Continued on page 479)



The Law of the Sea at low tide

JOHN J. LOGUE

THE GIANT UN Law of the Sea Conference is still reeling from the one-two punch which the Reagan administration gave it in early March. On the eve of spring-meeting in New York Secretary of State Haig instructed the U.S. delegation to tread water during that session. The delegation was told to oppose agreement on a final treaty because the new administration was undertaking a thorough "review" of the "Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea" which the Conference officers had issued in late August last year.

Haig's instructions startled and angered many delegates to the 160-nation Conference. They recalled that at the end of last summer's Geneva session, the then head of the U.S. delegation, Elliot Richardson, had predicted that the seven-year-old Conference would reach agreement on a treaty draft at its 1981 session. That draft, said Richardson would be very similar to the Draft Convention. If Jimmy Carter had been re-elected there was a chance, but only a chance, that Richardson would have been proved a good prophet—and an effective cheerleader. However, that chance all but disappeared last November when Republicans took both the White House and the Senate.

On March 9, the opening day of the New York meetings, the Reagan administration threw its second punch. In a Monday morning massacre several high ranking members of the U.S. delegation were summarily fired. The purpose of the firings was "to ensure that other nations understood our seriousness of purpose with respect to the review." That was how James Malone, the new delegation head, explained it to a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early June.

During the March-April session the U.S. delegation marked time. So did most other delegations. And that is what they are

expected to do this month when they—or some of them—convene in Geneva. The Geneva meetings are being held in spite of U.S. opposition and in spite of Ambassador Malone's announcement that the "Reagan review" will not be finished until the fall. Although there is brave talk about completing a treaty this summer, few delegates take it seriously. The length of the Reagan review makes it all but certain that serious negotiations will not resume until the spring of 1982 or even later. A second 1982 session—or a 1983 one—is quite likely. It will not be easy for the Conference to bridge the broad gap between the Reagan ideologues and the ideologues of the Group of 77, the caucus of some 120 developing nations.

How *should* the precious months of this "Reagan Pause" be used? How *will* they be used?

Conference leaders should join rank and file delegates and nongovernmental observers in a concerted effort to improve a Draft Convention that is very disappointing, although not for the reasons advanced in the Reagan administration. However, it is already clear that most of the Conference establishment will fight any attempt to remedy the basic faults in the draft treaty. For many months they have discouraged criticism of it by saying that the Conference will collapse if "the delicate balance of the Draft Convention" is upset. That they can keep a straight face while using the phrase "delicate balance" is remarkable because the Draft Convention is weighted overwhelmingly in favor of a very few geographically fortunate nations, most of them rich nations.

What Conference delegates and Conference watchers should be doing during this most crucial period is to take a fresh look at this long and incredibly complex treaty Draft. So should the many concerned people who should have been following the Conference but weren't. All of us should be asking what the Law of the Sea Conference has done with the magnificent opportunity it had when it first convened in late 1973. We should be asking how well the Conference has lived up to the great expectations the world had for it in 1967 when Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta made his famous Common Heritage Address in the UN General Assembly. Central to that address was Pardo's idea that offshore mineral wealth could be

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and should be a major source of development funding for low-income countries. His basic thesis was that a bold approach to the ocean crisis would completely transform the international situation and greatly improve the world's chances for peace and justice.

WHAT DOES Pardo think of the Draft Convention? Not very much, not very much at all. No longer a diplomat—he is now a political science professor at the University of Southern California — Pardo is now free to speak his mind. In May he told a reporter from the *Toronto Globe and Mail* that if the Draft Convention were signed tomorrow, “it is probably the most inequitable treaty that has ever been signed.” Those are strong words from the father of the Law of the Sea Conference. They should make the world—and the delegates—stop and think.

Pardo had tried to move the world in the opposite direction, i.e., toward bridging the gap between North and South. In his 1967 address he said that by 1975 the Maltese Proposal would generate five billion dollars a year for international community purposes. Almost all of that money would have come from a common heritage tax on the exploitation of offshore oil and gas. In the 1980's the Maltese Proposal would have meant twenty billion dollars a year and for an obvious reason. The barrel of oil that sold for less than three dollars each in 1967 is selling for more than thirty dollars a barrel in 1981. Pardo's twenty billion dollars a year would be a perfect answer to the eloquent pleas of the Brandt Commission, the General Assembly, UNCTAD and many other bodies that the world find a way to secure regular, substantial, and assured funding for the least developed countries. Twenty billion dollars a year would be more than half the thirty billion dollars a year which the Brandt Commission insists those countries need.

In the sessions of the UN Seabed Committee (1968-73) and the Law of the Sea Conference (1973-?) the diplomats praised Pardo to the skies. However they rejected the very heart of his proposal, i.e., revenue-raising from offshore oil and gas. In its 1970 Seabed Declaration the General Assembly deliberately rejected Pardo's plea that the common heritage area begin, as he repeatedly urged, “beyond present national jurisdiction.” The Assembly substituted the phrase, “beyond national jurisdiction.” Not surprisingly the substitute phrase was interpreted as an invitation to coastal states to grab as much of the oceans' resources as they could, as quickly as they could. And grab they did.


Indeed, the major function of the Draft Convention will be to legitimize those unilateral grabs of trillions of dollars of ocean resources, grabs which were made while the Law of the Sea diplomats were conducting a talkathon, which is now well into its fourteenth year. The Conference officers put a 200-mile “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) into each of the several negotiating texts they drafted for the delegates' consideration. The EEZ article is the most important article in the treaty. Ignoring the declared opposition of a group of some fifty landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, its authors defined the EEZ in such a way that the coastal states will

get every penny of the more than thirty trillion dollars worth of oil and gas within the zone. And it is precisely within the zone that the overwhelming proportion of exploitable oil and gas is to be found. As Pardo and many others have pointed out, two dozen countries, more of them rich than poor, will get the overwhelming proportion of that EEZ wealth.

What will the Draft Convention do for the eight hundred million people on this planet who live in abject poverty? The answer is “almost nothing.” And that “almost nothing” won't really get under way for at least ten years. There are two sources of common heritage funding in the Draft Convention. One is a modest tax on the very limited amount of oil and gas which will be exploited beyond 200 miles. The other is a tax on the exploitation of the polymetallic nodules of the deep ocean. A fair estimate of the common heritage income that will be available from those two sources is \$500 million dollars a year, a scandalously small sum, about 1/40th as much as would have come from the Pardo proposal. No wonder Arvid Pardo is angry!

ALTHOUGH THEY are not nearly as significant as the EEZ, other features of the Draft Convention have received far more media attention. This is particularly true of the arrangements for deep seabed mining. Indeed a cynic might regard the mighty tempest with respect to the deep seabed as a scam cleverly designed to divert attention from the great ripoff of the offshore oil and gas. It is about the deep seabed portion of the treaty that the Reagan administration has its greatest reservations. The Draft Convention provides for an International Seabed Authority which would manage a dual system of deep ocean mining, half of it done by the Authority's own operating arm, known as the Enterprise, and half by private and state companies. What drives the Reaganites up the wall is that in order to protect the interests of land-based producers of those same metals, e.g., Zaire, Zambia and Peru, the Authority could and would severely limit nodule production. This interference with the free market is denounced as sinful by conservative U.S. senators, the same senators who regularly vote to limit the production of tobacco, milk, soybeans and many other agricultural commodities in order to protect the income of American farmers.

The deep seabed portion of the Draft Convention is so complex that there is good reason to believe that it may never go into effect. Surely its most bizarre features are those having



to do with the adoption of the Seabed Authority's rules and regulations, without which the Authority cannot operate. According to the treaty the adoption of the rules and regulations, a most controversial question, will take place *after* the treaty is signed. Furthermore adoption of those rules and regulations will require the unanimous vote of the thirty-six nation Council. The Draft Convention's euphemism for this "everybody has a veto" system is "consensus." While some observers see the practice of deciding by consensus as a most constructive innovation, others see it as a device for postponing unpleasant decisions. Unfortunately, some decisions have to be made. A decision to postpone can be a decision to abdicate responsibility.

By putting off the adoption of rules and regulations until after the treaty is signed the Conference establishment would achieve two of its most important objectives. The first objective was to end the marathon Law of the Sea Conference, and, if at all possible, to end it on a note of triumph. Ending the Conference on a note of triumph is of no small importance to a United Nations which has been deeply embarrassed by the length of the Conference and by the world's perception of it as a probable failure. A glittering signing ceremony in Caracas would seem to be the cure. The second objective, dear to the heart of geographically advantaged countries, is to see that coastal nations get a certified title to the immense wealth of the EEZ, no matter what, if anything, happens to the proposed Deep Seabed Authority. The Draft Convention does that beautifully. Indeed it gives a few geographically fortunate countries, the "broad margin states," sovereign rights to seabed resources far beyond the 200 mile EEZ.

The idea of signing the treaty before agreement is reached on the Authority's rules and regulations bears an uncanny resemblance to Senator George Aiken's famous formula for ending the Vietnam war, i.e., "Declare a victory and get out!" It will be some months, possibly even years, after the signing session before the world learns whether the thirty-six-nation Council can reach consensus on the rules and regulations of the Authority. If it can't reach agreement, the Council will be blamed and not, hopefully, the Conference or the United Nations. If it can't find rules and regulations which will satisfy all thirty-six nations maybe it can allocate revenues, slim as they are, in a way that will satisfy all thirty-six or decide to help countries adversely affected by deep seabed mining in a way that will satisfy all thirty-six. But if one or more nations says "No" there will be no rules and regulations, no distribution of revenues, no aid to adversely affected countries.

THERE IS a striking resemblance between the current debate on the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1979 debate on the SALT II Treaty. And there is a striking difference. Each treaty draft in both cases was a great disappointment to champions of world order. The result was that neither treaty had support that was either very broad or very deep. Many supporters of SALT II were convinced that it would do very little to restrain the arms race, indeed that it tended to legitimize that race. Supporters of the Draft Conven-

tion are aware that the major impact of the treaty they are asked to champion is, as Pardo has said, to enrich the rich and to make the poor poorer.

But there is an important difference between the attitudes of SALT-watchers and Law of the Sea-watchers. The SALT-watchers complained bitterly that the Carter administration had confronted them with a *fait accompli*. They would have warmly welcomed an invitation, had it been proffered, to help shape the SALT II Treaty . . . Not so the Law of the Sea-watchers. Instead of using the precious months (be they nine or nineteen) of the "Reagan Pause" to improve a very bad treaty they are making support of the present text of the Draft Convention an article of liberal faith.

Their "near-sighted realism" insures that they will have very few battalions available to confront the Reagan administration when it finally makes its demands to the Law of the Sea Conference. Traditional internationalists would have been excited by the kind of Law of the Sea treaty Arvid Pardo called for. They haven't gotten interested—and won't get interested—in a Draft Covenant which enriches a few already rich nations, and adds a few Kuwaits to the developing world but ignores the desperate need of eight hundred million human beings.

It is even possible, though not likely, that the Reagan administration will surprise everyone and accept the Draft Convention with only minor changes. After all, in the early seventies the U.S. opposed the 200-mile EEZ—and thereby contributed greatly to the popularity of the Draft Convention in United States. The scenario could be repeated with respect to the Draft Convention. Indeed, U.S. opposition has already contributed greatly to the popularity of the Draft Convention in a Third World which used to be very skeptical about it. And if, which could happen, the Reagan administration suddenly endorses the Draft Convention, the "realists" will realize that their imprudent prudence had helped to bury—and bury forever—Arvid Pardo's common heritage and all that it could mean, not only for developing nations, but for developed nations as well.

Fortunately, Arvid Pardo's banner is still waving in the Law of the Sea Conference. Some four weeks *after* the Reagan review was announced twelve nations introduced a revised version of a Common Heritage Fund proposal that was first introduced in 1978. Most of the revenue for the Fund would come from a common heritage tax on the oil and gas in the EEZ, a tax graduated to the per capita income of the coastal states as well as to their offshore mineral income. Champions of the CHF Proposal say that in the near future it would provide some five billion dollars a year for the international community and substantially more in the years to come. Pardo says the CHF Proposal deserves the most serious consideration. Among the twelve countries sponsoring it is Singapore, whose UN Ambassador, Tommy Koh, was elected President of the Conference several weeks before the CHF Proposal was introduced.

The conventional wisdom says that the bold and imaginative Common Heritage Fund Proposal, first introduced by Nepal in

1978, is too controversial and too late and would be a "treaty breaker." In fact the Proposal is just in time. Appearances to the contrary, the proposal has a fighting chance. Although almost all of its sponsors are landlocked states, a number of coastal states have indicated their sympathy and/or support for it. These include Algeria, Egypt, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. The major obstacle is not the developed countries, who would probably accept it, however reluctantly, but the Latin American countries, several of whom approach the Law of the Sea with all the ideological fervor of the Reagan administration. Unless they rethink their position, the Latins will bear the major responsibility for the scandalously unjust treatment which Third World countries get in the treaty. With a little skill and a little luck the CHF Proposal could be sold inside and outside the Conference as a very sound and sensible way of narrowing the scandalous gap between the rich and poor nations, something which is in the national interest of all nations, and not least the United States.


The party of Ronald Reagan is also the party of Arthur

Vandenberg and Paul Hoffmann, two Republicans who played important roles in launching the Marshall Plan in the late nineteen forties. Those far-sighted realists didn't begin by asking "What will sell?" They began by asking "What is necessary?" It was only after they had answered that question that they discussed how the plan could be sold to that Republican 80th Congress. President Truman and the Republican leadership were able to sell it to the American people not because they were brilliant salesmen but because the product they were selling was an answer to a deeply felt need.

What the Law of the Sea establishment and their supporters need is a better product, a much better product. When they get that better product they will be able to sell it to the American people and to the people of the world. For the excitement Arvid Pardo aroused fourteen years ago didn't come from the novelty of his ideas but from their quality and relevance.

There is still time, courtesy of the Reagan review, to get the Law of the Sea Conference to do what it was supposed to do. But there is not much time.

BUILDING ON VICTORIES IN FRANCE & ITALY



A Eurosocialist future?

MITTERRAND MEANT IT

WHAT KIND OF SOCIALISM IN FRANCE?

ALAIN WOODROW

MANY PEOPLE who did not vote for François Mitterrand, and even some of those who did, appear surprised that he actually intends to put into practice what he promised during his election campaign. They are surprised to discover that the former First Secretary of the Socialist party still proclaims himself to be a socialist now that he is president, and that his socialism was not one of mere opportunism.


He could not have been clearer in the message he delivered

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to Parliament on July 9th. "My electoral promises constitute the charter of the government's action," stated Mr. Mitterrand, who added: "If it should prove necessary to modify or enlarge this course of action in the future, this will only be possible after the people, in a new electoral consultation, have said their last word."

This course of action was then spelled out in great detail by Pierre Mauroy, the Prime Minister. Here are the salient points of the government's program. The two guiding principles are the reduction of unemployment and the curbing of inflation. These objectives are to be reached by the creation of new jobs (210,000 public jobs to be created immediately) and the stepping up of industrial activity. By 1985, the thirty-five hour week should be achieved and a fairer distribution of the salary scale, at present one of the most extended in Europe. In addition, old-age pensions, aid to the handicapped and family allowances will be gradually increased.

How will these social measures be financed? Apart from the hoped-for industrial growth, the main source will come from increased taxation. Firstly by the levying of a new tax on large individual fortunes, leading in the long term to a reform of the



whole tax system; and secondly by a more determined attack on tax evasion, at present very widespread. The new government intends to restore the democratic workings of parliament (written and oral questions and answers, abolition of the "vote bloqué," etc.) which had been progressively eroded under the preceding regime. During the present legislature, bills will be introduced to abolish the *Cour de Sécurité de l'Etat*, the army tribunals, the recent law on security and liberty and the death penalty.

Other reforms will affect the police, the mass media and the judicial system. Under Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's presidency, all three were periodically shaken by scandals. The police, increasingly used as an instrument of oppression, were at the command of the politicians in power and used to cover up such scandals as the assassination of the Prince de Broglie, the so-called suicide of a prominent cabinet member and the tapping of the *Canard Enchaîné's* telephones.

The television, radio, and press constitute another area where reform was long overdue. The television forms a government monopoly and was regarded by recent presidents almost as a propaganda machine: "the voice of France," as de Gaulle put it. The heads of the three channels were nominated by the president, and the government exerted continual and direct pressure on them, with regard to the content of the programs, especially the newscasts. The socialist government has announced a sweeping reform for the autumn, and promised that there will be no more direct interventions or censorship.

Another pledge the government plans to keep concerns decentralization. General de Gaulle, it will be remembered, resigned from office after having lost a referendum on this subject, although the issue was far from clear. Prime Minister Mauroy has promised to give real power to the regions, and even do away with the government-appointed prefect system as it now exists.

The most controversial chapter of the socialist program, however, is that dealing with nationalization. The first target is the banks, at least the three major ones. The minor banks will escape nationalization, and also the various private industrial holdings of the major banks. "The banking sector will remain pluralist," stated Mr. Mauroy. "We have no intention of establishing a monopoly over the credit system."

With regard to industry, eleven major groups will be nationalized. Of the eight French ones, three will be nationalized immediately: the Dassault group, which produces military equipment, mainly aeroplanes; the Matra group, especially the armament sector; and the metallurgical complex Usinor and Sacilor, which is undergoing a financial crisis. Five other industrial groups will come next: the General Electricity Company; Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlman; Rhône-Poulenc; Saint-Gobain-Pont-à-Mousson; and Thomson-Brandt. The

last three, groups with wide foreign interests, will be the object of negotiations. They are: C.I.I.-Honeywell-Bull; I.T.T.-France and Roussel-Uclaf.

According to Mr. Mauroy, nationalization does not mean full state control. "The identity and autonomy of these companies will be safeguarded," he said. "They will retain their responsibility to act and take initiatives on the national and international levels." Further, the Prime Minister assured the groups concerned that private shareholders would be reimbursed equitably. Mr. Mauroy also stressed the socialist government's intention of playing an active role in the building of Europe, and in stepping up France's aid to the Third World, to reach the desired target of 0.7 percent of the gross national product.

What kind of socialism is represented by the new French government? In spite of the presence of four Communist ministers in minor posts, one would need to be an American—and a naive one at that—to speak of a "marxist threat" or see "a red under every bed." The French socialist party is made up of divergent, not to say conflicting, currents, of which only one, the Ceres group, takes a marxist line. The important cabinet posts, on the other hand, have gone to middle-of-the-road or right-wing socialists, like Pierre Mauroy (Prime Minister), Jacques Delors (Finance) or Claude Cheysson (Foreign Affairs).

As for Mr. Mauroy, he refuses to make a distinction between "social-democrat" and "socialist." "I see myself as a socialist having inherited two cultures of the French left-wing tradition, that of Jules Guesde and that of Jean Jaurès," he is quoted as saying. "I have many new ideas in common with Mr. Helmut Schmidt and, in spite of our differences, I would say that we belong to the same family."

The Catholic church in France is keeping a low profile after the victory of the left. Particularly on the vexed question of the abrogation of aid to private schools, church authorities are anxious to avoid polemics, and they have accepted the government's assurance that nothing will be decided without lengthy bilateral negotiations.

At their recent congress in Toulouse, the militantly anti-clerical Teachers' Union (*Syndicat national des instituteurs et professeurs de collège*) voted unanimously in favor of the "nationalization of the education system" and the "abrogation of the existing anti-lay legislation." Their position was widely condemned by all shades of opinion, even eliciting a rebuke from Alain Savary, Minister of Education.

Msgr. Pierre Evt, rector of the Catholic Institute of Toulouse, who has just been elected rector of the Paris Catholic Institute, expressed his surprise at the position adopted by the Teachers' Union, adding: "One should make a distinction between the combative laicist position of this Union and the pro-lay position welcomed by Catholics. Indeed, the latter are more than willing to participate in the reform of the school system envisaged by the Minister of Education. In any case, the church is resolutely in favor of peace on the schools question."

Less irenic, perhaps, was the remark made by the papal

legate to the Eucharistic Congress in Lourdes, Cardinal Bernardin Gantin, who said that this Congress "should give French Catholics the occasion to pray and reflect on the momentous political events that have recently taken place in France." He didn't say whether the prayer should be one of propitiation or thanksgiving.

THE CRAXI STRATEGY

A MODERN POLITICAL SYSTEM FOR ITALY?

LEO J. WOLLEMBORG

IS ITALY at last on her way to acquiring a modern set of political parties? A significant step in that direction may well be represented by the outcome of the regional and municipal elections which took place on June 21-22 and involved almost twenty-five percent of the Italian voters. The big winner was the third-ranking Socialist party (PSI). It scored major gains everywhere, projecting a rise of its share of the national vote from ten to almost fifteen percent and placing on much firmer ground its claim to bat in the same league with the long-ruling Christian Democrats and with the powerful Communist party (PCI). The Christian Democrats barely held their own in Sicily and suffered heavy losses in Rome, Genoa, and other cities of Central and Southern Italy. The Communists yielded more ground in Sicily and elsewhere in the South while faring fairly well in Rome and Genoa. The sizable gains made by the Social Democrats (PSDI) and the good performance of Liberals and Republicans underscored the overall shift away from the polarization around the two major parties. The Christian Democrats and Communists, who had polled almost seventy-three percent of the votes in 1976, got less than sixty-four percent this time.

In the early postwar years, the Socialists had nosed out the Communists to take second place behind the Christian Democrats. But the PSI split badly at the outset of the cold war. The majority lined up alongside the Communists, while one-third of the Socialist leadership and electorate supported the newly formed and pro-western Social Democratic party.

Veteran Socialist chieftain Pietro Nenni set about to correct the mistakes for which he bore much responsibility. Slowly but surely he loosened the ties with the Communists and in the early 1960s the Socialists joined the Christian Democrats in a center-left governmental coalition pledged to active participation in the Atlantic alliance and to the implementation of long overdue domestic reforms. Thereupon, the pro-Communist wing of the PSI bolted, cutting down the party's following to ten percent of the electorate.

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Meanwhile an economic boom, unattended by adequate modernization of the economic, social and administrative structures, had backfired leaving the country exposed to the twin dangers of inflation and recession. The center-left governments concentrated on coping with these dangers while the reform program was shelved or watered down. This suited perfectly many Christian Democrats: in the 1968 elections, their party managed to win back most of the voters who had switched to the right-of-center parties as a protest against the "opening" to the Socialists. But the Communists made sizable gains, mostly by appealing to frustrated Socialists. The Socialist party and the Social Democratic party, which had merged in 1966, polled far fewer votes than they had received when running separately, and soon afterwards the two parties split again.

By mid-1975 the leadership of a floundering Socialist party vented its disappointment over the results of the collaboration with the Christian Democrats by pledging that the party would support only governments including the Communists. The eminently expectable result was to push more Socialist voters into backing the Communist ticket. In the wake of the 1976 electoral defeat, a young, dynamic but rather composite socialist leadership came to power. The new secretary general, forty-two year-old Bettino Craxi, was a pupil of Nenni and intended to fulfill the old man's dream of putting an end to the Christian Democratic hegemony over the government and to the Communist hegemony over the Italian left. Craxi, however, owed his rise to the party secretaryship to an alliance with the Socialist leftwingers who still favored close ties with the



Communists. The fight for control of the Socialist party lasted some years, but by 1979 Craxi was ready to seize the opportunity offered by the collapse of the "historic compromise," the understanding between Christian Democrats and Communists which would have put the Socialists in a nutcracker. The Socialists supported a revived center-left coalition led by the Christian Democrats, while the Communists went back into the opposition.

Thanks to this realignment, the Socialist party has again become the kingpin of Italian politics and Craxi has made the most of it. He has stressed and deepened his party's differences and divergencies from the Communists, downplaying its traditional Marxism and even changing its symbol from the hammer and sickle to the red carnation. Under Craxi, the PSI has moved closer to being the most pro-American among West European Socialists; it has notably come out early and strongly for the modernization of NATO's theater nuclear weapons as a necessary counter to the new Soviet missiles. At the same

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time, Craxi has emphasized the "competitive" nature of the Socialist collaboration with the Christian Democrats, strongly criticizing the handling of national affairs during the long years of their supremacy and asserting his party's right to replace them at the government's helm. Meanwhile, the Socialists continue to work with the Communists in the many regions and cities where it has long held control or has recently ousted the Christian Democrats as the Number One party. Accordingly, Craxi's Socialists enjoy the benefits and perquisites of sharing national power with the Christian Democrats and much local power with the Communists.

Most important, Socialist leader Craxi has managed to project the image of the "new" PSI as a "can do" party, equipped and committed to delivering the much needed reforms and modernizations that the Christian Democrats have not been able or willing to carry out and that the Communists cannot be trusted to pursue with methods and aims acceptable to a democratic, Western-oriented society.

The recent electoral returns show that such a Socialist party can appeal to sizable sectors of the middle classes which by now make up the large majority of the country. The Socialists gained ground at the expense not only of the Christian Democrats but of the Communists as well. Craxi has also developed a working agreement with the Social Democrats and has improved relations with the Liberals and the Republicans.

ALL OF THIS PROVIDES a good base on which to build. The electoral triumph scored by Mitterrand's Socialists in France further encourages Craxi's ambitions and may help his party to still further gains at the polls. Despite recent setbacks, however, the Communists retain the allegiance of over thirty percent of the voters, twice as many as their French counterpart. The Christian Democrats may or may not have started down Sunset Boulevard, but very few observers expect them to fade away so quickly as the Catholic MRP did in France twenty years ago.

Some statements by Craxi shed light on the strategy he intends to follow under the circumstances still prevailing in Italy. He says that there is no alternative to a governmental coalition with the Christian Democrats until and unless the voters bring about a radical change in the traditional balance of political power. Craxi further says that "an alternative of the left" cannot materialize "under Communist leadership." In plain words, the Socialist leader rules out a governmental alliance with the Communists until his party becomes much stronger and the Communists much weaker. In the meantime, the Socialists will work with the Christian Democrats in running national affairs but on terms likely to help them to emerge as the leading partner in the ruling coalition.

The Communist leaders charge that Craxi's approach weakens and may further split the left, props up "the corrupt and inefficient Christian Democratic regime" and underwrites "the aggressive policies pursued by the Reagan administration against the Soviet Union and against Europe's own autonomy and welfare." These charges are amplified by quite a few Italian papers which claim to be politically independent but are

basically anti-American and want the Communists in the government and the Christian Democrats out of the picture. The Communists also sought to use their control over major sectors of organized labor to harass the governments which include the Socialists and exclude the Communists. Yet, the Communist leaders are reluctant to precipitate an open break with the Socialists which would highlight their party's political isolation and jeopardize their hold in key regional and municipal administrations.

The Christian Democrats look with concern and misgivings upon their all-too-brilliant Socialist partner. They know that every electoral gain for them and every loss suffered by their own party bring closer the day when Craxi will be in a position to make good his claim to the Premiership. Only a few weeks ago the Christian Democrats had to agree, as a lesser evil, to let the top government post, for thirty-five years their monopoly, go to the Republican Giovanni Spadolini, head of one of the smallest Italian parties (less than four percent of the popular vote). Like the Communists, however, the Christian Democrats seem unable to develop an effective answer to the Socialist challenge.

All this does not mean that, from now on, Craxi and his party will have clear sailing. As so often in politics, the Socialists' main problem is timing. Naturally enough, Craxi looks forward to a general election to translate his party's political momentum into additional seats in Parliament. But the bright prospects of the Socialists would be endangered if Craxi were to precipitate the downfall of the incumbent government in order to force an early resort to the polls or to press all-too-eagerly his claim to the Premiership. On the other hand, Socialist fortunes would also suffer if hesitation and delay should frustrate the high expectations aroused by the party's recent performance.

All in all, the new Socialist course and the warm welcome it is receiving from the voters do point to the best opportunity in many years to develop in Italy a democratic system attuned to the requirements of the late twentieth century. If Craxi and his lieutenants continue to play their cards skillfully over the next few, crucial years, a Socialist "third force" might well grow to represent twenty-five percent of the electorate. Both Christian Democrats and Communists could then be cut down to size under circumstances making for a consolidation of democratic institutions and an easing of social and economic strains. To the right of the Socialists there would still be room for an updated moderate-to-conservative party strong enough to provide a counterweight and possibly to alternate with them at the helm. For the Communists, the dilemmas would be painful and the outlook bleak. Their leaders could hardly hope to stem defections to the booming Socialists without giving new and decisive impetus to their party's Westernization. Such a course, however, would be strongly opposed by those many Communists, from the rank and file to the top layers of the party, who are still deeply committed to the Marxist-Leninist ideology and to solidarity with Moscow. In the end, only a minority of the Communists would be likely to split away and join the democratic left as junior partners of the Socialists.



A VERDICT IN THE PLOWSHARES EIGHT CASE

Order in the court

MARY MEEHAN

JUDGE Samuel W. Salus II made several interesting statements on July 28th, when he sentenced Daniel Berrigan, Philip Berrigan, and six other pacifists to Pennsylvania state prisons for their destruction of nose cones designed to carry nuclear bombs. Judge Salus first said that he had no personal antagonism toward the group, who are known as the Plowshares Eight. Then he complained at length about them, suggesting that they were "malcontents," and about their supporters, suggesting that they were arrogant people who had given him unasked-for advice. If he could choose any punishment at all, the judge remarked, his first choice would be to send the Eight to a leper colony and have them do personal service for the lepers. His second choice, he said, would be to send them to the Soviet Union so they could protest over there and experience repression. By this time, some spectators may have wondered what Salus would suggest if he *did* have personal antagonism toward a defendant. Flogging? Hanging by the thumbs?

The judge sentenced the Berrigan brothers, another priest (Carl Kabat) and a lawyer (John Schuchardt) to three to ten years in state prison. He sentenced the other four — Molly Rush, Dean Hammer, Sister Anne Montgomery, and Elmer Maas — to shorter terms; and he revoked bail for all, even though they were appealing the case.

No one who had watched Judge Salus preside over the Plowshares trial last winter was very surprised at the sentencing — or could be very surprised by anything he might say or do. But some were surprised when, two days after the sentencing, a higher court permitted the Plowshares Eight to post bail. (Four of them declined to do so.) Their appeal may take a year or more; if it is successful, another judge may have a chance to give them the fair trial that Salus denied them the first time around.

The Eight would have a difficult time winning acquittal even with a fair judge — not because their defense is poor, but because it is so unusual. They freely admit that they entered a General Electric plant in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, last September and hammered and poured blood on two Mark 12A nose cones. Their actions, which were based on Old Testament suggestions about beating swords into plowshares, resulted in

criminal charges ranging from burglary to conspiracy and criminal mischief.

Since there is little dispute about the facts of what the Plowshares Eight did, their only chance of acquittal rests on two arguments of law: 1) that nuclear weapons are forbidden by treaties to which the United States is a party — treaties which under our Constitution take precedence over state law; and 2) the "justification defense" of the Pennsylvania code, under which breaking a law may be excused when a person acted to avert a greater evil. An example would be trespassing in order to save a child trapped in a burning house.

From the first day of jury selection last February, Judge Salus made it clear that he did not want to hear arguments based on international law. When defendant Elmer Maas tried to raise the issue in his testimony, the judge said, "No, no. You're trying to get in the back door what you can't get in the front." Evidently international law was not to be allowed in any door of his courtroom. Yet the U.S. Constitution, Article VI, says quite clearly that treaties are part of "the supreme law of the land" and that "the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Several treaties to which the United States is a party seem to bar the use of nuclear weapons. The Hague Convention of 1907, for example, forbids the use of "poison or poisoned weapons" and "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." It also forbids "the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended." A Geneva Convention of 1949 forbids "violence to life and person" of non-combatants. If judges in every state are "bound thereby," why couldn't Judge Salus listen — and allow the jury to listen — to arguments based on these treaties?

The "justification defense" is similar to the common-law "defense of necessity." Excusing the breaking of a law when this is done to prevent a greater evil is an example of the wisdom of the common law. Some pro-lifers who have engaged in sit-ins at abortion clinics have been acquitted under this principle, since they were trying to save lives. The Plowshares Eight were trying to do the same. But Judge Salus instructed the jury that the justification defense did not apply. He suggested that the greater evil the Eight sought to prevent was not "imminent." Yet he had refused to let the defense call expert witnesses who could have testified to the imminent danger of nuclear war.

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During jury selection, the judge had asked all prospective jurors if they would follow his instructions on the law. This is a common practice of judges, a principal means of controlling juries. The only problem, as the defendants kept trying to say, is that jurors also have a responsibility to their own consciences and to the law. Sister Anne Montgomery quoted something John Adams wrote when America was still an English colony. If a judge gave instructions against a basic English constitutional principle, said Adams, the obligation of a juror was plain: "It is not only his right but his duty in that case to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court." The Adams philosophy is like a forgotten legacy, waiting to be dusted off and used by juries against "hanging judges." The prosecutor, of course, objected to the Adams quote, and Salus sided with him.

Anyone who has watched a good judge run a trial knows that it is almost a work of art, requiring an even temperament, a deep sense of fairness, willingness to hear difficult issues, and trust in the good judgment of the jury. Legend says that Andrew Jackson, when a young judge in Tennessee, used to instruct juries: "Do what is *right* between these parties. That is what the law always *means*." If there is a second time around for the Plowshares Eight, it would be nice if they could have a judge like that.

Dance

BARYSHNIKOV'S TURN

A TIME OF TRANSITION

DURING ITS four-decade history the American Ballet Theater has never confined itself to a single esthetic but has rather sought to present the best examples of a variety of artistic approaches. This has included both nineteenth and twentieth century works with the balance being determined somewhat arbitrarily.

At times the company has emphasized its "Americanness"; at others it has borne a distinct "Russian" or "French" look in repertory. Presently it is undergoing another self-appraisal under the direction of its new artistic head, Mikhail Baryshnikov. This past season was the first given according to his programming priorities and featured revivals of twentieth century classics such as George Balanchine's "The Prodigal Son" and "La Sonambula," Sir Frederick Ashton's "Les Rendezvous" and Paul Taylor's "Airs," as well as a revised version of Michel Fokine's "Les Sylphides," and Nijinsky's "Afternoon of a Faun."

The company's stock of nineteenth century ballets, "Giselle," "Sleeping Beauty," and "Swan Lake," have all been re-examined with an eye toward decreasing mime passages and emphasizing their pure danced elements. To these

have been added *divertissements*, again pure danced passages, from August Bournonville's "Pas de Trois" from "The Guards at Amager," first seen in this country during the Royal Danish Ballet's appearance in 1976, Petipa's "Jardin Animé" from "Le Corsaire," *divertissements* from Act II and III of "Raymonda," and a duet from "La Fille Mal Gardée" presumably based on Petipa's production.

In all cases, narrative and dramatic elements have been de-emphasized in the direction of the danced, "abstract" ballet. This shift in approach is associated with the development of ballet in the twentieth century and Fokine's "Les Sylphides" is its first clear and powerful example. The nineteenth century works however were conceived under the older dispensation and look strangely denuded, shorn of these elements.

There is no question that they now move along with a greater impetus, in much the way that Baryshnikov's own three-act ballet, "Don Quixote" does, but much of their resonance and harmonic development required the more leisurely and, at times, diversionary pacing. In an effort to give us the essence of these productions Baryshnikov has come close to the distorting reductions that the "heart of the symphony" recordings once represented.

In "Giselle" the naturalistic Act I followed by the surreal, romantic Act II has lost much of its drama to begin with and much of the mystery that concludes it. "Swan Lake" now has its emphasis focused on the conflict between the innocent Prince Siegfried and the evil magician Von Rotbart almost as a *mano a mano* confrontation rather than the by-product of the Prince's love for the bewitched Swan Queen. "Sleeping Beauty" is represented only by its culminating last act which is a series of *divertissements* lacking the dramatic setting of the rest of the ballet. The task of preparing others of the works presented may have precluded mounting the full production and only time will tell whether the approach will have any success with this classic.

Among the nineteenth century *divertissements* "Jardin Animé" was by far and away the most successful. Susan Jaffe, quite clearly one of the company's most promising young dancers, was paired with Christine Spizzo to lead the corps in this lushly romantic ballet. The corps members carry garlands of flowers which they deploy in a variety of pleasing formations through which the soloists pass repeatedly. The work demands clarity and precision and was beautifully danced.

In recent years the corps has been strengthened, and it is apparent that Baryshnikov regards them as the bedrock upon which the whole company must stand. Throughout the season they met the demands placed on them and are obviously being shaped to resemble the type of corps dancing that prevailed at the Kirov, which is the model Baryshnikov presumably wishes to emulate.

The *divertissements* in "Raymonda" have less of the choreographic cohesion of "Jardin Animé" but again one was struck by the superlative work of the corps. At this point the only weakness is a feel for character dancing which is demanded by these excerpts. However, the cohesiveness and

strength of the group is what dominates the scene and makes the most lasting impression.

"La Fille Mal Gardée" (Pas de deux from Act I) is a vehicle for display dancing and worked well for Rebecca Wright and George de la Pena as did the "Pas de Trois" for Cheryl Yeager, Peter Fonseca, and Lisa de Ribere. All of these artists were offered numerous challenges throughout the season and responded well.

The twentieth century revivals have on the whole had far the better of it. Both of Balanchine's ballets have been restaged with their original values restored. "The Prodigal Son" has reacquired its rough-hewn athletic vigor and "La Sonambula" is saturated with the gothic density of horror that is its special aura. Ashton's "Les Rendezvous" flutters along with social butterfly gracefulness. The ballet celebrates youth, infatuation, and playfulness with the sophistication and warmth that characterize Ashton's work at its most felicitous level.

Taylor's "Airs" is a suite of dances for four women and three men that was originally designed for his own modern dance company but which translates wonderfully well for the balletically trained corps and soloists of American Ballet Theater. "Les Sylphides" has been in repertory since the early forties when Fokine himself staged it. In recent years it has tended to drag a little and Baryshnikov inserted a new male variation that he knew from his days as a member of the Kirov Ballet in an effort to add some sparkle.

It is a good variation but then so was the old one, and the substitution made little difference to the overall pacing of the work which is too weighty for its gossamer mood. "Afternoon of a Faun" is the only one of Nijinsky's three ballets to survive and deserves a place in active repertory. Its present production, however, lacks the intensity of other stagings and visually is quite muted. The original Bakst decor is well known and one would have thought that it would be a simple matter to recreate this in its original dazzling brightness.

In addition to these productions repertory staples such as deMille's "Rodeo," Twyla Tharp's "Push Comes To Shove," Tudor's "Lilac Garden," and Robbins's "Interplay" filled out the season. Of all the choreographers represented, Tudor has been least well served by the new emphasis on pure danced values since his ballets require a density of gestural nuance for full effect and this unfortunately was missing. It seems especially sad since Tudor, designated as "Choreographer Emeritus" in the program, is one of the founding masters of the company and of the development of the psychological ballet.

Baryshnikov danced extraordinarily well throughout the season, demonstrating that his additional duties have not diminished the quality of his performance. Cynthia Gregory's classic line remains one of the glories of the company as does the purity of Martine Van Hamel and Gelsey Kirkland. Natalia Makarova's romantic phrasing is still riveting as is the crystal-line movement of Fernando Bujones.

It is a time of transition for the company. It remains strong at the principal level, has pushed forward soloists such as Warren Conover, Miss Wright, and Miss Yeager, and brought out

corps members, most notably Miss Jaffe. The repertory is still being re-examined and it is this process which has recorded mixed successes. Future seasons will reveal the overall design.

DON McDONAGH

Screen

SUMMER SOLDIERS

SUPERMAN MEETS MR. JONES

THE TWO SUMMER biggies, though doing about the same dollar volume at the box office, were not created equal in my opinion. *Raiders of the Lost Ark* is a treat; *Superman II* is, unfortunately, closer to treacle. The inferiority of *Superman II* is in part the poor quality of its villains. Its black trinity of Zod (Terence Stamp), Non (Jack O'Halloran) and Ursa (Sarah Douglas) is no match for *Raiders'* evil triumvirate of an international adventurer named Belloq (Paul Freeman), a Nazi officer (Wolf Kahler), and, best of all, a weak-sighted Gestapo agent in a black leather trenchcoat (Ronald Lacey). The only character in *Superman II* who could have topped these three is Lex Luthor (Gene Hackman). He was the best thing in the first *Superman*, and takes the prize again in the new film. If anything, Hackman plays his role in *Superman II* with even more ghoulish relish than before. But this time we see precious little of Lex.

He is second fiddle to Zod, Non, and Ursa, who are penal exiles from Superman's home planet, Krypton, and have powers equal to his. Zod, Non, and Ursa sounds like the name of a punk rock group, and that's exactly how the three villains look in their black, shiny, skin-tight jumpsuits, their platform boots, and their death-mask make-up. They also play their collective role with pure punk affectation. They're not so much from outer space as just spaced out. They're full of bored omnipotence. They have total contempt for the world (i.e., the planet Earth) and everyone in it. Zod, Non, and Ursa are too much Superman's equal, too much a mirror image of his celestial, ultimately rather dull self. Lex is just the ticket because he supplies to the movie all the personality that Superman lacks. Lex is super-human himself in a way that balances Superman's strengths endearingly. He's an intensification of everything weak and vile in human nature. He's the quintessence of connivance. How I miss him!

The real edge that *Raiders* has over *Superman II*, however, is not in the villainy. It's in the heroism. Even Zod, Non, and Ursa make this apparent, for in being too much like Superman himself, they make us aware of what a bland fellow he is. *Superman II* betrays its super-hero doubly by embroiling him in a love affair with Lois Lane (Margot Kidder). Just as Zod, Non, and Ursa are the too perfect counterpart for Superman, the befuddled Lois is too perfect a mate for Clark Kent. She has always been inescapably dumb. How bright could someone be

who can never figure out what is so painfully obvious — that Clark and Superman are one and the same? Actually, in *Superman II* she *does* figure this out briefly. But it doesn't help much to build her up as a character. Instead of making her seem smarter than we thought, her insight lowers our estimation of Superman himself.

When Clark, confronted by her, finally has to drop the act, we realize just how little acting there was in it. Except for being faster than a speeding bullet and able to leap tall buildings at a single bound, Superman is indistinguishable from Clark. What hides behind the latter's clumsiness and klutziness is the same unimaginative, passionless dolt who's hiding in *front* of them. It is a tribute to Christopher Reeve's acting abilities that he can bring to the role of Superman the mind-flattening blandness and lack of range or subtlety it requires.

Why I find *Raiders* a more engaging bit of nonsense than *Superman II* is somewhat hard to explain. Certainly, most of the objections I've made to Superman's character, or lack of it, could be leveled at Indiana Jones (Harrison Ford) in *Raiders* as well. *Raiders* is as exciting as a Superbowl that goes into sudden-death overtime. It also has about as much character development as a football game. In the innumerable interviews he gave out while hyping *Raiders* at the beginning of the summer, director Steven Spielberg never tired of claiming, "All good movies start with character." I don't know which movies those are, but they're clearly not *Raiders*. *Raiders* starts, middles, and ends with a plot. It throws plot at the audience so fast and furiously that character development hardly has any room to get in edgewise.

The character with which *Raiders* starts is a silhouette, a man in a Peruvian jungle standing against the light with his back to us. Even when he suddenly turns to whip the cocked pistol from the hand of a desperado sneaking up behind him, we don't get a clear look at the man's face under the brim of his rumpled fedora. This introduction is of course intended to establish Indiana with us as a man of mystery. At the end of the film, somewhere around two hours later, he is still just a shadowy outline. Very little detail has been filled in. What we have learned about him, we should perhaps not be surprised, is rather contradictory. On the one hand, he is a dedicated archaeologist trying to recover the world's antiquities. On the other hand, his methods are those of a soldier of fortune, which is what his girlfriend Marion (Karen Allen) accuses him of being. On the eve of his departure to search for the "lost ark" referred to in the title — the Ark of the Covenant — he tells a colleague and mentor, "This is everything we got into archaeology for!" It's an ambiguous, not completely innocent remark, made, as it is, while packing his revolver and trusty bullwhip.


The fact is that when it suits the filmmakers for Indiana to be clean-cut and noble for a few minutes, that's the way he is; and when it suits their purposes at some other moment for him to be shady and sinister, he acts that way. This film represents a collaboration among some of the more strong-willed whiz kids in Hollywood. Its script by Lawrence Kasdan is based on a story by Philip Kaufman (*Invasion of the Body Snatchers*) and

George Lucas (*American Graffiti*, *Star Wars*). As executive producer, Lucas even had final say over Spielberg, who, with *Jaws* and *Close Encounters* to his credit, is a fairly heavy *macher* himself. Perhaps Indiana's inconsistencies as a character are inevitable, since so many people with overactive fantasy lives were pushing and pulling on him at once. Maybe the filmmakers just decided, wisely, to accept the vagaries and contradictions that their collaboration was bound to create in Indiana.

In fact, what makes this movie good — what makes it a lot better than *Superman II* — is that Indiana is completely at the mercy of forces beyond his control. The way he is roughed in as a character by Spielberg, Lucas, et al. is nothing compared to the way he is roughed up during the movie itself. The going over he gets from the filmmakers sets him up for the one the other characters give him. Even Marion socks him right in the jaw, hard, the first time they get together. It's a moment that contains, much more than his dramatic entrance at the beginning, the key to his appeal. Despite all the exaggeration and braggadocio in *Raiders*, Indiana is in the end a rather credible hero. He's not a super-hero strong enough to defend truth and justice and the American way. He's just a guy who's riding the whirlwind and trying not to get tossed off. He's having everything in the book thrown at him, and hoping that somehow he'll be able to get out with his skin. At one point when Marion asks him how he plans to accomplish something, he pleads, "How do I know? I'm making this up as I go along." Not exactly. Spielberg and Lucas made it up as they went along. Indiana is only trying breathlessly, desperately, to keep up with them.

The big love scene that he has with Marion is a bit different from Superman's with Lois. Indiana can hardly find a place for her to kiss him where the pain isn't too much to bear. Grin and bear it is very much the mentality of this movie. Spielberg and Lucas obviously think of the average moviegoer as some poor guy who feels that with all the crap coming down on his head in the world today, if he didn't laugh he'd cry. *Raiders* is the movie that gives the guy a chance to laugh.

COLIN L. WESTERBECK, JR.



Books: TWO THESES ON ETHNICITY

THE REDISCOVERY of ethnicity in the late 1960s was part result and part reaction to the emphasis on identity in the black civil rights movement. New ethnic writers proclaimed what Andrew Greeley called "the ethnic miracle." They disputed the melting pot theory and projected an America that was a collection of sub-cultures. They also argued that certain ethnic groups were able to succeed because of superior cultural values. That, according to Stephen Steinberg, comprises the essence of the ethnic myth.

The trouble with that myth is that it is an extension of a neoconservative vision of American life. It is not accidental that the major new ethnic writers — the Greeleys, Glazers, and Novaks — are prominent among that band of intellectuals known as "neoconservative" — conservatives who were former liberals and leftists. These new ethnics overlook or downplay class issues and concentrate on ethnic and familial concerns. In Nathan Glazer's famed declaration, social policy is limited because it cannot deal with major areas of American life; the cause of poverty and other social problems ultimately lies in the cultural heritage that has formed each individual, and governmental policy, they claim, cannot reasonably affect such problems.

Thomas Sowell is a prominent black neoconservative economist. *Ethnic America* is a readable, serviceable account of nine ethnic groups: Irish, Germans, Jews, Italians, Chinese, Japanese, Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans. It is a sophisticated history that acknowledges recent scholarship.

If the book has a thesis it is that America has done well, and continues to do well, with its immigrants. Some have done better than others, but all, given time, will obtain a modicum of success. Although Sowell points out that he discards the notion of superiority and inferiority, he equivocates. He states that certain groups succeed because "they are better or worse adapted to a particular set

ETHNIC AMERICA

Thomas Sowell
Basic Books, \$16.95, 353 pp.

THE ETHNIC MYTH

Stephen Steinberg
Atheneum, \$14.95, 277 pp.

Maurice R. Berube

of circumstances" — a position that would place him close to Steinberg. But the thrust of his various histories gives strong support to the view that cultural values, in the long run, prevail.

Moreover, he is suspicious of social policy. He believes that governmental policy of the past two generations — welfare, minimum wages and affirmative action — impedes the progress of the ethnic poor, (especially blacks, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans) by reducing opportunity and creating dependency. He notes that the Jews and the Japanese suffered discrimination and racism and climbed the economic ladder without help from government. The implication is that if these groups can do it, why can't others?

Most important, discussing his own group, the blacks, he subscribes to the neoconservative tenet that blacks constitute the newest urban immigrants. That, he says, rather than racism and discrimination, accounts for their status of being on the bottom. Yet, blacks were among the first "immigrants."

Steinberg's is the more important of the two books. That is because he confronts the larger questions concerning ethnic mobility and ventures a bold analysis. He significantly undermines the thesis that certain ethnic groups succeed because they possess innately superior cultural values. *The Ethnic Myth* is a provocative, lucid and well-reasoned book. It deserves to be read by those concerned with ethnicity and class in America.

Steinberg's argument is that economic necessity and historical accident con-

verged to move ethnic groups up or down the economic ladder. He is at his best when he depicts the interplay of these forces. For example, Steinberg gives us the plausible explanation that Irish women became domestics not because of inferior cultural values but simply because they immigrated singly whereas Italian and Jewish women came over with families intact.

Steinberg is also effective in tracing the decline of ethnicity. At present one out of three Jews marries outside his or her ethnic group and a large majority of Catholics marry outside their ethnic groups. The speaking of foreign languages is on the wane among the young of the older ethnic groups. Ethnic food is proving to be the last bastion of ethnicity in America.

Steinberg's analysis however, raises as many questions as it answers. Surely, Jews had a head start in the economic race because they were urbanized and highly skilled. But how does one account for the spectacular rise of the Irish, who were peasants and unskilled?

My only reservation with *The Ethnic Myth* is that in attempting to show the crucial importance of class Steinberg gives too little credence to the role culture and racism have played. The argument that Jews moved out of poverty with little aid of education (accepted also by Sowell) is not sufficiently docu-

The thesis advanced here is that the ethnic revival was a "dying gasp" on the part of ethnic groups descended from the great waves of immigration of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. That is to say, the revival did not signify a genuine revitalization of ethnicity, but rather was symptomatic of the atrophy of ethnic cultures and the decline of ethnic communities.

Stephen Steinberg
The Ethnic Myth

mented. Suffice it to say that both Steinberg and Sowell rely on recent studies which show that the majority of Jews had become white collar by the 1920s. More reliable would have been statistics indicating incomes of Jews. Indeed, Steinberg's own school, Queens College, is comprised mostly of Jewish students from lower working class families, 45 percent of whom earned less than \$16,000 in 1979 — not exactly "economic security." Jews took advantage of a free city university in New York mostly in the thirties — a time when it is probable that many Jewish families suffered some economic hardship. Steinberg may have done better to consider the Jewish cultural passion for education partly as a response to discriminatory patterns in American society that instilled in Jews the necessity of higher education for economic advancement. Both Jews and Japanese sought out colleges as a way to further improve their lot.

Equally important, the quasi-Marxist view Steinberg espouses consistently neglects race. In this instance, Steinberg (like Sowell) perceives race as incidental. Economic considerations, he argues, are why blacks have been unable to move out of poverty. Steinberg advances a macro-economic theory that the Southern economy needed black agricultural workers whereas the Northern economy required immigrant industrial workers. However, historian Stephen Thernstrom in *The Other Bostonians* reveals how white ethnics displaced black workers. In 1860 the Irish ranked below blacks in Boston's occupational structure; a century later a majority of blacks held unskilled jobs at the bottom.

As Nathan Glazer observed recently, the three explanations for ethnic mobility are culture, class, and racial and ethnic discrimination. Although each plays a significant role, what one considers decisive influences one's perception of social policy. For the new ethnics and their belief in the supremacy of cultural values, self-improvement, rather than governmental aid, is the answer. Unfortunately, that is the reigning philosophy in the White House. Reagan and his advisors would do well to seriously consider Steinberg's *The Ethnic Myth*.

The debate over ethnic mobility is by no means exhausted. Steinberg has ably presented the class interpretation and Sowell has added to the cultural view.

What would be enlightening would be future studies delineating the effects of racism and discrimination on ethnic groups in America.

A post-Vatican II pilgrimage

SECOND SPRING THE COMING OF AGE OF U.S. CATHOLICISM

Charles A. Fracchia
Harper & Row, \$9.95, 176 pp.


Ed Marciniak

CAN the personal memoir also serve as the history of a turbulent era? In *Second Spring*, Charles A. Fracchia recounts his spiritual pilgrimage since the 1940s, while seeking at the same time to explain the tumultuous events that roused U.S. Catholicism during the same decade.

For Fracchia, the 1940s signaled the last days of the immigrant U.S. church. He knows them well. He describes the

ritual of the Latin Mass through the youthful eyes of an altar boy; the cultural experience of Sunday Mass at an Italian Catholic parish in San Francisco; "going to Confession" for the first time as another first-grader confesses to adultery, thinking it meant disobeying adults; sex education in a Catholic elementary school, and his three-year stint in a Jesuit novitiate. (Unblushingly, he drops the name of a fellow novice, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., the "future governor of California.") Fracchia reminisces with tenderness and, at times, eloquence. His evocative rendering of pre-conciliar U.S. Catholicism, the old-time religion, is nostalgic and affectionate, unlike the accounts of others who discarded it with disdain and bitterness. "This rich herit-

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age," he argues, must be recognized and built upon in the "future reconstruction and renewal" of the church in the United States.

For Fracchia, the 1950's and early 1960's were the heyday of "Jubilee Catholicism," otherwise known as "Commonweal Catholicism." It "had its roots in the 1930's and its beginnings in the metropolitan centers of New York [where the *Catholic Worker*, *Jubilee* and *Commonweal* were published] and Chicago [home of the Christian Family Movement, Friendship House, The Grail, Catholic Labor Alliance, Thomas More Bookstore, St. Benet Library, Chicago Inter-Student Catholic Action, Sheil School of Social Studies and similar organizations]."

It was an era of optimism, of intense identification with the Catholic church, and of new movements to bring that church into the modern world. In those days, lay and clergy leaders were, he says, "politically and socially liberal, open to European theological influences, and in revolt against the 'ghetto mentality' of U.S. Catholicism." In the postwar years, a new breed of Catholic surfaced, well-educated, more affluent and intellectually alert. This led to a passive resistance to the anti-intellectual, clerically-dominated, ethnically-inspired U.S. church.

Finally, the winter of discontent arrived. By the mid-1970's, "the docile U.S. Catholic church became a tempest-tossed institution in total disarray . . . with attacks on the pope, bishop-baiting, an unprecedented exodus of priests, brothers and nuns from their vocations . . ." and "mass abandonment of Catholic practices among U.S. Catholics." What happened? In that era four major influences were shaping the U.S. church.

- In the background was U.S. society. "This was a United States which had gone from the Camelot idealism of the Kennedy years to the massive efforts of the Johnson administration to end poverty in the United States. . . . The ensuing frustration created a mounting crescendo of criticism, and the expanding conflict in Vietnam compounded both the frustration and the criticism. . . . Traditional

values were set aside — often denounced — as the would-be makers of a new order blamed the ills of society on the established institutions — church, state, corporations, academia."

- The U.S. church could sense within it the active presence of a laity, highly articulate, well-educated and theologically literate. Many were graduates of Catholic colleges. They were women and men who questioned hackneyed presentations of the church's teaching, showed displeasure at carelessly prepared liturgies and dozed through sermons laced with Dale Carnegie banalities. Furthermore, they refused any longer to remain quiet about an arbitrary or authoritarian religious establishment, whether personified by a bishop, sister, lay person or priest. The institutional church could ignore the new lay voices only at its peril.

- Only a marooned Catholic could escape the call for *aggiornamento*, the impact of the debates which stirred the Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965. Then came, in rapid succession, the reforms emanating from the Council: religious freedom, liturgy in the vernacular, re-examination of the traditional role of religious orders, fresh appreciation of other Christian churches, dialogue with non-Christian religions, and other changes.

- In addition to these influences upon the U.S. church, there was the impact of the indecision, the politicking and the dissent that surrounded the issuance of the encyclical *Humanae Vitae* in 1968. Its delay had generated widespread expectations that the encyclical would somehow modify traditional teaching against contraception. When it did not, the repercussions were explosive.

Second Spring, and its unequivocal subtitle, "the Coming of Age of U.S. Catholicism," promises to reveal substantial clues to the direction of the U.S. church in the 1980s. That promise is only partially fulfilled. His highly personal memoir stands Fracchia in good stead as he recounts the recent history of U.S. Catholicism, but that kind of an approach to assessing the future is an uncertain, highly subjective indicator. It enables him to disguise his own preferences as trends and to extrapolate to the U.S.

church as a whole his own personal "struggles with the dimension" of his "spiritual life." He anticipates this criticism by admitting that the "book is a premature exploration," that he is "too close to the events." And yet, he says, "the work of description and interpretation must begin somewhere." But is it not precipitate to conclude, and he does, that "the immigrant experience for the church has ended"? That the "assimilation of generations of the descendants of these immigrants into the mainstream of society" has "become an almost accomplished process"? He qualifies this hasty generalization by noting that the impact of the new waves of immigrants, mostly of Hispanic origin, "has not been comparable" to that of earlier Catholic immigrants. To suggest at this time, as he does, that in the United States the rapidly growing Hispanic population of fifteen million, predominantly Catholic in origin, will not significantly affect tomorrow's Catholicism in the United States, is too provincial — and too dismal — an outlook.

Readers can judge for themselves how well Fracchia identifies the main features of a U.S. Catholicism come of age in the 1980s. "U.S. Catholicism in the future," he claims, "will be a structural pluralism. Gone, probably forever, will be that monolithic uniformity. . . . Catholic charismatic communities will exist side-by-side with Catholic groups that will dedicate their lives to social apostolates and gather together each day to recite the Divine Office. . . . There seems to be no doubt that an increasing number of Catholics in the United States are seeking *more*, not less, in the way of spiritual experience. If the U.S. Catholic church is unable to feed this spiritual hunger, many of them will go elsewhere. . . . Thus far, the Catholic charismatic movement has been the most visible and discernible experience of spiritual renewal in U.S. Catholicism following the Second Vatican Council."

In addition, Fracchia finds that increasing numbers of U.S. Catholics are rediscovering a neo-orthodoxy within U.S. Catholicism. What he calls neo-orthodoxy might better be called neo-traditionalism or neo-conservatism. Pre-

senting neo-orthodoxy as "one of the most vital movements in U.S. Catholicism," he describes it through the standpoint of students at the St. Ignatius Institute in San Francisco: "They are more interested in the works of Teresa of Avila than those of Rosemary Ruether, the life of Thomas More rather than that of Charles Davis." More important for Fracchia is their indifference to the swirling controversies of recent decades: "These students don't see their involvement with St. Ignatius Institute as a pre-conciliar throwback nor as a conservative rear-guard action. Instead, they believe they are learning a tradition which is applicable to their contemporary work; the assimilation of the past into the present."

The genius of twentieth century Catholicism in the United States was that it

could generate women and men who had an impact on both church and state, who moved easily between city square and cathedral. That was the catholic style of John A. Ryan, John F. Kennedy and Dorothy Day, still visible today in the work of Sargent Shriver, George G. Higgins, Theodore Hesburgh and Cesar Chavez. Each of them, in his or her own way, could not influence one terrain without also affecting the other. Their religious stance is ecumenical, outgoing and irenic — singularly free of polemic and dogmatism. If Fracchia correctly projects the religious future, he maps, in his optimism, a different road for U.S. Catholicism, one which turns it inward, making it just another Christian denomination, a sect without any unique, overriding distinction.

In a Preface, she states, "We are stimulated to emotional response not by works that confirm our sense of the world, but by works that challenge it." Among the challenges Ms. Oates accepts is that of practicing a relatively new critical technique—fantasizing structures for works of literature other than those given by their authors.

The books which have moved her to literary criticism (which she defines as "the most ingenious form storytelling can take") are Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, Dostoyevsky's *The Possessed*, *King Lear*, Conrad's *Nostromo*, Lawrence's *Women in Love*, Joyce's *Ulysses*, and the English and Scottish traditional ballads. It is tempting to remark those properties, of the authors she has taken time to study, which might have helped shape her own vision.

For instance, could the supernatural dimension and central Gothic image of the allegorical *Dorian Gray* have "influenced" her own Gothic extravaganza, *Bellefleur*, an allegorical book which (in an Author's Note), she herself describes as "a region, a state of the soul"?

Overview of an extraordinary mind

CONTRARIES

Joyce Carol Oates

Oxford University Press, \$15, 188 pp.

A SENTIMENTAL EDUCATION

Joyce Carol Oates

E.P. Dutton, \$11.95, 196 pp.

THREE PLAYS

Joyce Carol Oates

Ontario Review Press, \$10.95, 158 pp.

Robert Phillips

If Shakespeare had left behind autobiographical or critical essays, what a boon they would be to critics! We might not have to guess at how many of the echoes of Marlowe, Kyd, and the aphoristic Lyly are legitimate influences or acts of homage in his journeywork.

Not that she would welcome comparison to the Bard; but Joyce Carol Oates, one of our most prolific and intellectual contemporary writers, fortunately has published two previous collections of critical essays. *Contraries*—her third—is her most illuminating in terms of her own fictional concerns. These seven essays were prompted by personal and

emotional responses and are enlivened by her own experiences as a writer. Together they give an intriguing overview of Ms. Oates's extraordinary mind.



**Dietrich Bonhoeffer's
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28 August 1981: 475

Is ritual violence, which she reads as so necessary to Dostoyevsky, as necessary to the integrity of an Oates novel such as *Them?* or perhaps even more so to her plays? Is her reading of Conrad, with action serving as the "barbed hook" that leads inevitably to man's destruction, a gloss on her recent novel, *Cybele*? Certainly Edwin Locke of that work follows Stein's famous imperative, "in the destructive element immerse," as does Andrew Petrie, of her *The Assassins*. Can one read her dissection of *King Lear* without reflecting upon her fascination with "the mimesis of an action 'tragic' in its intensity, involving defeat and triumph, often in inexpressible terms" (to quote from the Preface to her *Three Plays*?)

Oates's discussion of Lawrence's novella, *The Escaped Cock*, is instructive in light of her evangelical novel, *Son of the Morning*. Both share a protagonist whose love of mankind is no more than a form of egotism, perhaps even madness, which will touch and devour multitudes. And James Joyce's multivoiced compositions and wordplay surely were precursors of Joyce Oates's own *Childwold*. Her concern for Lawrence's attempts to integrate the male and female principles is reflected, perhaps, in her "Queen of the Night," the first story in her latest collection, *A Sentimental Education*.

Certainly it is not necessary to cross-reference Ms. Oates's books with these literary capstones she examines in *Contraries*. These essays can and will read on their own as vigorous and illuminating critical examinations. But with a writer as challenging as Oates, it is welcome to have some entrées into the world of her imagination. *Contraries* offers such entrée. My favorite essay, on the English and Scottish "traditional" ballads, deals with those universal themes and presences which haunt us all, Joyce Carol Oates not excepted.

To call a fiction *A Sentimental Education* may seem an act of folly or of hubris, recalling what for many is the favorite among Flaubert's novels. Yet the allusion is justified. Like Flaubert's chronicle of interwoven lives under Louis Philippe, Oates's title novella also depicts calf love, disillusion, futility, the

passage from youth to maturity, but depicts it without Flaubert's fascination for the counterrevolutionary currents in this country's politics.

And yet Oates does depict the breakdown of a society. As Oates observes in her essays on *The Possessed*, "As society approaches crisis and breakdown, preparatory to reaffirmation of its identity, it provokes private disintegration, private ceremonial exorcism." This is the spectacle we witness as, over the course of one summer on the island, nineteen-year-old Duncan experiences erotic love for his younger cousin. Brilliant, unbalanced, and given to wild reaches of imagination, Duncan first seduces the girl and then, unable to silence her, proceeds to kill her. The act is performed at the edge of the ocean, in a secret, slimy place smelling of fish. Psychologically and symbolically Oates has rarely been more powerful.

As I have observed in *Commonweal* in an earlier review, Oates's story collections are never randomly put together. The six pieces in this volume all concern individuals whose passions blind them to reality. It is their "driveness" which drives the book and makes it cohere. In "Queen of the Night" a vain divorcée marries a young lover before discerning, or admitting, his homosexuality. "The Precipice" concerns a mild-mannered professor and his inexorable tug toward the violence which ultimately triggers his own murder. "The Tryst," a Cheever-like story, revolves about a wealthy married man's dalliances, and the one time he is tempted to bring one of his girls into his home. The afternoon ends with bloodshed and the fear of disclosure.

In "In the Autumn of the Year" a distinguished woman poet is forced to confront the fact that her early, luminous love affair was (at least in the eyes of her lover's wife and child) a sordid and dirty thing, that she herself had been used and intimidated and duped by her lover. Further, her own earlier behavior, which she has regarded as "free" and "passionate," must now be seen as selfish and injurious to others. Her actions were responsible for the near-death of her lover's wife. Her own life has not been "poetic" after all, but mean.

Each of these stories is highly dramatic, focusing upon one vital occasion in the life of a protagonist from which he or she will never adequately recover. It should not surprise, then, that Ms. Oates has been drawn to write for the stage. The *Three Plays* are "Ontological Proof of My Experience," "Miracle Play," and "The Triumph of the Spider Monkey." They were produced originally in New York in 1972, 1973, and 1979, respectively. All three concern ceremony, ritual, and what Oates calls "the inexpressible coherence of 'fate': the disharmonious music that is torn from us at certain moments in our lives and in history." Which is merely to say that these dramas are dramatic.

Like Greek tragedies, they are also violent—among the most violent works in the Oates canon, in fact, portraying (on-stage or off) beatings, rape, machete murders, immolation, and facial disfigurement by boiling sugar water. Such violence at times supplants a surface realism and segues into surrealism. On either plane, Oates bears witness to the evils and complexities of the world in a manner usually attributed, by some critics, only to male writers. (She has the last word on this sexist notion in an essay ironically titled "Why Is Your Writing So Violent?," which can be found in the *New York Times Book Review* for March 29, 1981. It is required reading for anyone interested in her writing.)

REVIEWERS

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ROBERT PHILLIP's books include *The Confessional Poets* (Southern Illinois University Press), *Aspects of Alice: Lewis Carroll's Dreamchild*, *The Pregnant Man*, a collection of poems, and most recently, *Running on Empty: New Poems* (Doubleday).

ROBERT JACKALL is assistant professor of sociology at Williams College. He has just completed a year of field work on corporate managers on a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship.

The totalitarian corporation

THE OPPRESSED MIDDLE

POLITICS OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

Earl Shorris

Anchor Press, \$13.95, 393 pp.

Robert Jackall

WHAT is one to make of a book compelling in its very idiosyncrasy but so often monolithic and wrongheaded that it leaves the reader exasperated? Earl Shorris is an intelligent and at times gifted writer. The problem is that, in writing about corporate managers, he has read too much of writers like Hannah Arendt and relied too little on his own cogent first-hand perceptions. The result is a deeply flawed but nonetheless interesting book.

Shorris's basic thesis is that the modern corporation is totalitarian. For him, totalitarianism is not a complete social order like Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia, but a social process in which individual autonomy is destroyed. The process begins when a person accepts an externally defined notion of happiness—such as economic success—and tries to fulfill that definition by joining a large organization ostensibly set up for a benign purpose, like creating wealth. However, organizations, particularly those with economic goals, have their own dynamism; not only do they rationalize work to increase efficiency but, especially in the white-collar world, they rationalize the worker. In doing this, they borrow unintentionally the tools of totalitarian regimes and make, among other things, secrecy, fear, and betrayal commonplaces of corporate life. They reduce men and women to creatures totally dependent on the corporation who gradually abandon their love of freedom and become content with beefsteak and shrimp cocktail. Such acquiescence or "cession" to the organization is a prelude of what might await our whole society.

Shorris elaborates his argument in two parts. The first is a tortuous theoretical discussion of the social, economic, and


psychological conditions which favor the emergence of the totalitarian process. The section is marked by exegeses of writers as diverse as Plato, Rousseau, Kant, Machiavelli, Marx, Schumpeter, Kafka, Weil, Popper, and, above all, Arendt. But one wonders how much Shorris has grasped of these and other writers. For instance, he completely misses the structural thrust of Marx's notion of alienation, reducing it instead simply to psychological discontent; he maligns Studs Terkel's *Working* in a way that indicates he either didn't read the book carefully or has discounted what many of Terkel's interviewees actually say; and, most important, he misses perhaps the central aspect of Arendt's theory of totalitarianism, namely the crucial significance of terror (not shrimp cocktail) in maintaining fantastic ideological systems. Moreover, in his zeal to portray the plight of the white-collar worker, he paints an absurdly distorted picture of the blue-collar worker as a latter-day noble savage who is free precisely because of his alienation from an enveloping organization. There are minor irritations as well. Any writer who interlards his text with Latin phrases, à la Arendt, should at least learn the proper declension of *Homo*.

The second part of Shorris's book is a different matter. It consists of forty cautionary tales, all fictional, in which he presents scenes from corporate life to illustrate various facets of his notion of totalitarianism. Each tale is followed by a brief discussion. If one sets aside the few overly melodramatic stories in this bunch and prescind from Shorris's postscript attempts to straitjacket his own imagination, one can learn a great deal about the emotional reality of the management world from these fictional pieces; indeed, in this, Shorris comes a lot closer than sociological attempts to do the same. He uses his own managerial experience as a touchstone and pries away the public faces managers are so adroit at manipulating. What he reveals is a capricious, secretive, savagely competitive

world where appearances are more important than substance; where language is perverted and deceit the rule rather than the exception; where all moral issues are transformed into practical concerns; and where the price of success is the willingness to place one's very self continually in jeopardy. At their best, Shorris's pieces have the same disturbing resonance as Michael Herr's *Dispatches*. They are portraits of men and women caught in a moral maze, unable to understand even the terms of their confusion let alone a way out of the puzzle.

If such a portrait even approximates the truth, why discount Shorris's equation of the corporation and totalitarianism? The answer is simple and already hinted at. Jackboots not only symbolize totalitarianism; in a sense, they constitute the phenomenon. Totalitarianism hinges upon naked coercion; once the terror vanishes, as Arendt herself tells us, people awaken as if from a dream unable to believe what transpired. By contrast, the corporation depends upon its leadership, its managers,

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internalizing its criteria for success and actively rationalizing themselves. Managers are not just victims acted upon by their organizations; by tailoring their selves to suit their corporation's fashion, they participate to a great extent in shaping their own dilemmas and their own fates.

But even if Shorris's thesis fails, his searing portraits of the manager's world make the book worthwhile. At the least, they are a welcome antidote to the cheerful views of many organizational sociologists and consultants alike who suggest that all the corporation needs is a little tinkering.

Correspondence

(Continued from page 450)

as Robert Frost said, like playing tennis with the net down.) Whitman's free verse is a direct consequence of his democracy and of his hatred of restraint and norm.

Second, perhaps the press is now free enough to say something *uncomplimentary* about Whitman's homosexuality and its effect on his poetry and philosophy of democracy. Whitman was a homosexual aesthete, the first open one in a long line of modern aesthetes whose sexual proclivities determined their poli-

tics and morals: Swinburne, Hart Crane, Gide, Forster, and Ginsberg are others. And whether homosexual aestheticism has encouraged political justice, truth, or personal decency in the modern world may at least be doubted.

It is ironic that a Catholic journal, no matter how liberal, should celebrate Whitman or summon us to Borges's celebration of him. He is one of the "big daddies" of modern egotism; the great poetry is small in amount, squeezed out by the fattening ego. All of this has been brilliantly documented by Columbia's Quentin Anderson in his critical classic *The Imperial Self* (1971) and in his introduction to *Leaves of Grass* (NYU Press), "Whitman's New Man," where he writes that Whitman "was not least a genius in his understanding that a rejection of Christianity on behalf of an emotional egalitarianism would have to begin with a rejection of the idea that the self was internally structured by conscience." It may be doubted whether this rejection, now epidemic among Whitman's spiritual grandchildren, has improved American culture or life.

By comparison to Anderson's work on Whitman (and on Thoreau and Emerson), Borges's essay is puerile stuff.

MICHAEL D. AESCHLIMAN

Church & homosexuals

Chico, California

To the Editors: Louis Crompton's commentary on Boswell's book on homosexuality [June 5] was enough to break the faith of every Catholic homosexual decisively. There are highly reputable authorities on the homosexual preference who consider it almost completely comparable to left-handedness. Those of us who have lived with it throughout our lives have also found it just as natural and innocent as that, no more threatening. Is it possible that the church murdered people for centuries for being left-handed? How can it claim to have been especially enlightened by the power of the Holy Spirit in the face of such a perverse history of ignorance in this matter?

I can think of some reasons to fall back on, in desperation, such as: half of what medical science knows today it has

learned in the last twenty years; capital punishment, and death, were not looked at in the same light in those days; the church's view of human expressions of love, and sexuality within them, has changed greatly in recent years. However courageous my unscholarly thrusts, they are necessarily much weaker than Boswell's, who according to Crompton failed in his attempts to defend the church's basic integrity in its handling of homosexuality.

I need insights. I have to go to Mass next Sunday, as usual, to worship in spirit and in truth. How about at least a summary attempt to rebut Crompton in *Commonweal*, within the scope of my Catholic faith?

NAME WITHHELD BY REQUEST

Loving oneself

Kirkcudbrightshire, Scotland

To the Editors: I find John Garvey's piece, "Theology on the Knees" [April 24], a mite too hasty in its judgment of those who would love themselves. Loving oneself is arguably perhaps the only way we can actually heal ourselves in a world so busy destroying our identities and alienating us from our roots. Okay, I do not in any sense approve or like the self-indulgent narcissistic preacher, but such people are only a fringe group. The majority of people enter into some personal growth therapy for perhaps one or two periods in their lives in the face of an existential crisis which threatens to destroy them. Rightly viewed, these therapies are merely tools to be used and laid down after use. It is however inevitable because they are very powerful tools, and also new, that people will abuse and misuse them and even, as is suggested, create pseudo-religions out of them. It would be quite wrong though to deny people access to them by that argument. How many people do we know who but for the time they spent in retreat or with a therapist would still be

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living their lives struggling with unhealed childhood wounds?

But before I am misunderstood I must say that I wholly applaud John Garvey's sentiments. His passion for the victims of El Salvador, the cancer victims, the victims of Nagasaki, is absolutely correct. I must also, however, remind him that the horror of these things is caused by people who do not love themselves at all. These people become so consumed by all that is other and different from themselves that they are willing in their hate to ensure even their own destruction.

Loving oneself is not a narcissistic occupation but an absolute essential, nowadays especially. A part of learning how to do this is taking back one's projections (the splinter in the other's eye, the beam in one's own). If I hate the Russians perhaps it is because I also despise that aspect of myself that I imagine is bad in Russia. If I despise self-idolaters, perhaps it is because I also despise that aspect of myself that craves for love but never received enough. Pathologies such as these are very common in our society where the rules against achieving equanimity with our own emotions and especially our sensuality and anger abound. Loving yourself in this sense is far from an easy, happy process. It is more often very painful though the end result can be a greater peace of mind and a more out-going, joyous love of others that makes all the pain worthwhile.

It is a mistake and one which is easily perpetrated through our dualistic thinking patterns to see self-love over against love of others. Rightly understood, the two are different aspects of what it is to be a properly functioning whole human being. A human being cannot go out eternally and never come back. He will kill himself. How many utterly self-sacrificing and self-effacing bores do we know? Likewise a person cannot go into himself and never go out. He too will kill himself. How many obsessive navel-gazers do we know, if not literally dead then almost?

It is way past time we understood Christ's life and work more in such terms. The greatest of all the lovers of mankind saw his own dark side as we will never see ours, but unless we recognize

the need to see ourselves as capable of the most frightful atrocities, how will we be able to forgive ourselves even our small sins let alone the enormous ones committed by others?

Finally if we do not do this, we will never be able to get down on our knees and develop a passionate theology about anything because in the end it is only by getting down onto our knees that we can live again. Only by saying and holding true grief for all that we are that we can rise and kiss God's word again in true joy.

BENET HAUGHTON
The Lothlorien Trust

Author's request

To the Editors: For a biography of Fr. John LaFarge, S.J., I would appreciate hearing from friends, relatives and associates and receiving reminiscences, copies of letters, photographs etc., concerning Fr. LaFarge.

(REV.) EDWARD S. STANTON, S.J.
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA, 02167

Church/worldwatch

(Continued from page 450)

a different set of issues. Israel argued that the reactor was near completion and that the consistent enmity of Iraq toward the state of Israel justified a preemptive strike even though Iraq had signed the Nonproliferation Treaty and Israel could have requested inspection of the reactor. Israel's unilateral definition of what constituted a mortal danger and its unilateral determination of how to respond has implications which go beyond the Middle East. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and methods of preventing it is a global question. Several situations are at least comparable to Israel's dilemma if not identical with it. If the Israeli response is accepted as normative, the international system faces a qualitatively new threat to peace.

The U.S. response to both raids has been to suspend delivery of aircraft. No serious observer will judge this suspension to be anything more than a symbolic gesture. Delivery will occur; only the

date is unknown. Hence, the U.S. is left with actions which it presumably opposes, but which could be repeated. The question between the United States and Israel is not, as Prime Minister Begin portrays it, how much interference Israel can tolerate. It is, rather, how much passive acquiescence the United States can afford.

J. BRYAN HEHIR

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